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I. INTRODUCTION 
Plea bargaining now dominates the day-to-day operation of the 
American criminal justice system; about ninety-five percent of 
convictions are obtained by way of a guilty plea. 1 Indeed, despite 
the strenuous objections of prominent academic commentators,2 plea 
bargaining seems to be growing only more entrenched over time. 3 
Increasingly, scholars are turning their attention from abolition to 
reform, seeking ways to improve an institution that seems unlikely 
to disappear any time soon.4 In particular, recent reform proposals 
have focused on problems of accuracy and desert, attempting to 
address concerns that plea bargaining systematically results in 
1 See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FELONY DEFENDANTS IN 
LARGE URBAN CQUNTIES, 2002, at 28 (2006) ("[In felony cases filed in May 2002 in the nation's 
seventy-five largest counties g]uilty pleas accounted for 95% of the estimated 31,772 
convictions obtained within 1 year of arrest .... "); BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T 
OF JUSTICE, FEDERAL CRIMINAL CASE PROCESSING, 2002, at 11 (2005) [hereinafter FEDERAL 
CRIMINAL CASE PROCESSING] (showing that in year ending September 30, 2002, 69,072 of 
total 71,798 federal convictions (or 96.2%) were obtained by plea). Overall, taking into 
account other outcomes besides conviction, about two-thirds of felony cases in state court in 
large urban counties and about eighty-six percent of all federal criminal cases are resolved 
by way of a guilty plea. See FELONY DEFENDANTS IN LARGE URBAN COUNTIES, supra, at 25 
("[N]early two-thirds of defendants entered a guilty plea at some point .... "); FEDERAL 
CRIMINAL CASE PROCESSING, supra, at 11 (showing that 69,072 out of 80,424 total federal 
defendants were convicted by way of guilty plea). 
2 See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, Implementing the Criminal Defendant's Right to Trial: 
Alternatives to the Plea Bargaining System, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 931, 932 (1983) ("Even a 
cursory listing of objections to this practice may consume several paragraphs."); John H. 
Langbein, Torture and Plea Bargaining, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 3, 12-13 (1978) (comparing 
coercive effects of plea bargaining to medieval torture); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Plea 
Bargaining As Disaster, 101 YALE L.J. 1979, 1979 (1992)("[P]lea bargaining seriously impairs 
the public interest in effective punishment of crime and in accurate separation of the guilty 
from the innocent."). 
3 See Jacqueline E. Ross, The Entrenched Position of Plea Bargaining in United States 
Legal Practice, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 717, 718 (2006) (describing "well-entrenched" position of 
plea bargaining); Ronald F. Wright, Trial Distortion and the End of Innocence in Federal 
Criminal Justice, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 79, 91 (2005) (depicting pronounced upward trend in 
guilty plea rates in federal system since 1981). 
4 See, e.g., Nancy Jean King, Priceless Process: Nonnegotiable Features of Criminal 
Litigation, 47 UCLAL. REV. 113, 115-17 (1999) (rejecting absolutist positions on negotiability 
of criminal procedure rights in plea bargaining and proposing "middle ground" inquiry); 
Gerard E. Lynch, Our Administrative System of Criminal Justice, 66 FoRDHAM L. 
REV. 2117, 2145 ( 1998)(characterizing plea bargaining system as "largely acceptable," but not 
"incapable of improvement"); Fred C. Zacharias, Justice in Plea Bargaining, 39 WM. & MARY 
L. REV. 1121, 1123, 1126-27 (1998)("accept[ing] plea bargaining as a given" and arguing for 
adoption by prosecutorial offices of clear "plea-bargaining theory"). 
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conviction of the innocent, or otherwise imposes punishment that is 
unjustifiably harsh or lenient. 5 While such considerations of 
distributive justice are plainly compelling, this Article argues that 
procedural justice also ought to be part of the plea bargaining 
reform agenda. An exclusive focus on the outcomes of plea 
bargaining misses the important contributions that process 
potentially makes to the acceptance of outcomes and the perceived 
legitimacy of the criminal justice system. 
What would a procedurally just plea bargaining system look like? 
In answering this question, I focus particularly on the process by 
which prosecutors develop, present, and respond to proposed plea 
agreements, and I draw on a well-established body of social 
psychology research that has, until recently, largely escaped the 
attention of criminal law scholars. This research has identified 
5 See, e.g., Oren Bar-Gill & Oren Gazal Ayal, Plea Bargains Only for the Guilty, 49 J.L. 
& ECON. 353, 355-56 (2006) (proposing reforms to reduce risk of convicting innocent); 
Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow ofTrial, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2463, 2468 
(2004) ("Rather than basing sentences on the need for deterrence, retribution, incapacitation, 
or rehabilitation, plea bargaining effectively bases sentences in part on wealth, sex, age, 
education, intelligence, and confidence."); Joseph A. Colquitt, Ad Hoc Plea Bargaining, 75 
TUL. L. REv. 695, 759 (2001) (arguing that "ad hoc" plea bargains should be regulated because, 
inter alia, they "may bear little or no relationship to the charged offense or penological goals"); 
Markus Dirk Dubber, American Plea Bargains, German Lay Judges, and the Crisis of 
Criminal Procedure, 49 STAN. L. REV. 547, 600 (1997) (arguing for full implementation of 
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 and American Bar Association Standards for Criminal 
Justice in order to prevent wrongful convictions in plea bargaining); Oren Gazal-Ayal, Partial 
Ban on Plea Bargains, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2295, 2299 (2006) (arguing for partial ban on plea 
bargaining in order to reduce risk of wrongful convictions); Nancy J. King, Judicial Oversight 
of Negotiated Sentences in a World of Bargained Punishment, 58 STAN. L. REV. 293, 308 (2005) 
("Oversight of negotiated sentences by judges provides some assurance that bargains do not 
deviate too far, or too often, from legislated limits on punishment."); Susan R. Klein, 
Enhancing the Judicial Role in Criminal Plea and Sentence Bargaining, 84 TEX. L. 
REV. 2023, 2028 (2006) ("To ensure accuracy and equality [in plea negotiations], federal 
criminal defendants and jurists need the information necessary to determine whether a 
prosecutor could prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt to a jury, and the data regarding 
charges imposed and sentences levied against suspects alleged to have engaged in similar 
conduct."); Michael M. O'Hear, The End o{Bordenkircher: Extending the Logic of Apprendi 
to Plea Bargaining, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 835, 880 (2006) (arguing that coercive force of 
charging threats increases risk of wrongful convictions); Uzi Segal & Alex Stein, Ambiguity 
Aversion and the Criminal Process, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1495, 1549 (2006) (arguing for 
giving defendants right to bench trial to "divest the prosecution of its power to force 
defendants into harsh and inefficient plea bargains"); Jenia Iontcheva Turner, Judicial 
Participation in Plea Negotiations: A Comparative View, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 199, 200 (2006) 
(arguing that greater judicial involvement in plea bargaining"can render the final disposition 
more accurate"); Wright, supra note 3, at 86 (arguing for sentencing reforms that would 
improve accuracy of plea bargaining system). 
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several factors that contribute to perceptions of procedural justice, 
including whether the people involved have opportunities to tell 
their sides of the story (that is, whether they have "voice"), whether 
the authorities act in a manner that indicates neutrality and 
trustworthiness, and whether those involved are treated with 
dignity and respect.6 
This Article thus offers a first effort in legal literature to apply 
the social psychology model of procedural justice to the practice of 
plea bargaining. Using the model, I contend that plea bargaining 
should be regarded as procedurally just to the extent that 
prosecutors give defendants opportunities to tell their sides of the 
story before making or responding to an offer; explain their 
bargaining positions by reference to objective, uniformly applied 
criteria; demonstrate consideration of arguments made by 
defendants; and avoid the use of charging threats and other high-
pressure tactics to induce guilty pleas. 7 
In practice, many prosecutors and prosecutorial offices already 
embrace such procedural norms,8 but this by no means occurs on a 
uniform or systematic basis.9 For instance, despite detailed 
guidance regarding other aspects of plea bargaining, there is no 
treatment of procedural justice considerations in such authoritative 
statements of prosecutorial norms as the National District 
Attorneys' Association's National Prosecution Standards or the 
6 See infra notes 35-42 and accompanying text. 
7 See infra notes 64-85 and accompanying text. 
8 For instance, federal prosecutorial offices tend to employ relatively formal plea 
bargaining procedures that, consciously or otherwise, often comport fairly well with 
procedural justice norms. For a recent description of plea bargaining practices in one such 
United States Attorney's Office, see Mary Patrice Brown & Stevan E. Bunnell, Negotiating 
Justice: Prosecutorial Perspectives on Federal Plea Bargaining in the District of Columbia, 43 
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1063, 1065-92 (2006). This is not to say, however, the federal practices are 
beyond criticism. For instance, the time pressures imposed on some defendants to plead 
guilty pursuant to federal "fast-track" programs raise substantial proceduraljustice concerns. 
See JaneL. McClellan & Jon M. Sands, Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Policy Paradox 
of Early Disposition Programs: A Primer on "Fast-Track" Sentences, 38 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 517, 532 
(2006) (discussing fast-track sentencing and problems with plea bargaining); see also Lynch, 
supra note 4, at 2125 (describing "practices characteristic of federal white-collar criminal 
investigations involvingwell-financed defendants" as "somewhat idealized version of the plea 
bargaining process"). 
9 See Lynch, supra note 4, at 2129 (noting that plea bargaining procedures are not 
codified, "but negotiated case-by-case in the context of customary practice"). 
412 GEORGIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42:407 
Department of Justice's United States Attorneys' Manual. 10 Indeed, 
such disregard ofproceduraljustice by prosecutors is to be expected: 
social psychology research indicates that, while decision recipients 
evaluate fairness based chiefly on process, decision makers focus 
largely on outcomes.11 
Though unsurprising, the neglect of procedural justice is 
unfortunate. The social psychology research indicates that 
implementing procedural justice norms not only may increase 
defendant satisfaction with plea-bargained outcomes (even if the 
outcomes themselves remain substantively unchanged), but also 
may contribute to the perceived legitimacy of the criminal justice 
system and ultimately enhance defendants' levels of voluntary 
compliance with legal rules and authorities.12 There are, in short, 
good reasons to believe that greater attentiveness by prosecutors to 
procedural justice may increase the cooperativeness of defendants 
while they are under criminal justice supervision and decrease their 
likelihood of recidivism.13 
10 See NAT'L DIST. ATTORNEYS' Ass'N, NATIONAL PROSECUTION STANDARDS 190-99 (2d 
ed. 1991) (discussing standards for plea negotiations); U.S. DEP'TOF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES 
ATTORNEYS' MANuAL§§ 9-16.001-16.500, 9-27.330-27.650(2006) (setting standards for pleas). 
11 See Larry Heuer, What's Just About the Criminal Justice System? A Psychological 
Perspective, 13 J.L. & POL 'Y 209, 214--18 (2005) (reviewing decisionmaker studies). 
12 See generally Jonathan D. Casper et al., Procedural Justice in Felony Cases, 22 LAW 
& Soc'Y REV. 483 (1988) (discussing research on determinants oflitigant satisfaction, effects 
on procedural and distributive fairness, and implications for plea bargaining). 
13 See generally Raymond Paternoster et al., Do Fair Procedures Matter? The Effect of 
Procedural Justice on Spouse Assault, 31 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 163 (1997) (discussing study in 
which procedural justice was associated with reduced recidivism). In this Article, I focus on 
how the prosecutor's conduct during plea negotiations may diminish recidivism risks. 
Another promising body ofliterature explores the potential for defense counsel to contribute 
to rehabilitation in the plea-bargaining setting. See, e.g., David B. Wexler, Therapeutic 
Jurisprudence and the Rehabilitative Role of the Criminal Defense Lawyer, 17 ST. THOMAS L. 
REV. 743, 753-55 (2005) (discussing potential for empathy training for defense clients); Bruce 
J. Winick, Redefining the Role of the Criminal Defense Lawyer at Plea Bargaining and 
Sentencing: A Therapeutic Jurisprudence I Preventive Law Model, 5 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & 
L. 1034, 1049-51 (1999) (discussing, inter alia, defense lawyers' assistance with post-offense 
rehabilitation and use of rehabilitative efforts to negotiate downward departures in 
sentencing ranges). For a skeptical view of this literature, see Mae C. Quinn, An RSVP to 
Professor Wexler's Warm Therapeutic Jurisprudence Invitation to the Criminal Defense Bar: 
Unable to Join You, Already (Somewhat Similarly) Engaged, 48 B.C. L. REV. 539, 541 (2007) 
("[Professor David Wexler's] model not only runs the risk of displacing existing defense and 
clinical community values, but may well conflict with ethical and legal mandates for defense 
attorneys."). 
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I thus propose a novel criterion by which to evaluate plea 
bargaining practices, that is, whether defendants perceive the 
practices to be procedurally just. This criterion supports the 
implementation of reforms that are both practically feasible and 
capable of making important contributions to the ability of the 
criminal justice system to deliver efficient crime control. 
To be clear, I do not claim here that the proposed procedural 
justice norms are constitutionally or statutorily mandated (although 
I have argued elsewhere that charging threats do indeed raise 
serious constitutional problems14). Nor do I claim that these norms 
must always trump other objectives of the criminal justice system 
(such as speedy case processing) when and if they conflict. Rather, 
the point is that prosecutors should more systematically attend to 
procedural justice in plea bargaining; incorporate proceduraljustice 
into influential statements of prosecutorial norms, such as the 
National Prosecution Standards; and consider specific changes in 
office policies and practices that would bring plea bargaining into 
greater conformity with the procedural justice model. 15 
The Article proceeds in three parts, as follows. Part II sets forth 
background on plea bargaining. Part III lays out the basic case for 
procedural justice in plea bargaining. I summarize the pertinent 
social psychology research and theorizing, discuss how this work 
might apply in the plea bargaining context, and argue that the 
effects associated with procedural justice-greater acceptance of 
adverse decisions, enhanced perceptions of legitimacy, and higher 
levels of voluntary compliance with the law and legal 
authorities-are important and legitimate objectives of the criminal 
justice system. Finally, Part IV addresses a variety of potential 
objections, including, perhaps most importantly, those arising from 
14 See O'Hear, supra note 5, at 840 (proposing "a new rule of constitutional law that the 
[Supreme Court] should adopt if given a fresh opportunity to address the issue of 
prosecutorial charging threats"). 
15 As Ronald Wright and Marc Miller have recently observed, the internal administration 
of "justice agencies," such as prosecutorial offices, largely has been neglected by legal 
scholars. Ronald Wright & Marc Miller, The Screening/Bargaining Tradeoff, 55 STAN. L. 
REV. 29, 55 (2002). This is an unfortunate tendency, as they observe, because "scholars 
overlook central features of the American criminal justice system when they fail to consider 
the values that agencies might seek and how they might achieve those goals through internal 
rules." !d. Consonant with Wright and Miller's project, this Article might be thought of as 
an effort "to consider the values [i.e., procedural justice] that agencies might seek." Id. , 
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the transaction costs of procedural justice. These objections 
underscore the need for further empirical research and 
experimentation, but they are not so compelling on their face as to 
justify the continuing neglect of procedural justice by plea 
bargaining scholars and practitioners. 
II. THE PRACTICE OF PLEA BARGAINING: 
CHARACTERISTICS AND PREMISES 
This Part offers a brief overview of plea bargaining, suggesting 
along the way circumstances that are particularly likely to give rise 
to procedural justice problems. In developing a workable model of 
plea bargaining, the diversity of the real world must be reduced to 
manageable proportions. Thus, for simplicity's sake, I assume that 
plea bargaining is a bilateral interaction between a prosecutor on 
one side, and a defendant and his or her lawyer on the other, 
thereby disregarding the important role that judges sometimes play 
as de facto bargainers. 16 I also assume that negotiations involve a 
lawyer on the defense side, thus leaving to one side those cases in 
which prosecutors negotiate directly with defendants themselves. 17 
Finally, I assume that a plea offer (which can be made by either 
side) involves an express promise by the defendant to plead guilty 
to one or more specified charges in return for either the dismissal of 
other charges, a favorable sentencing recommendation by the 
prosecutor or both. 18 
16 See Seung-Hee Lee, The Scales of Justice: Balancing Neutrality and Efficiency in Plea-
Bargaining Encounters, 16 DISCOURSE & Soc'y 33, 34 (2005) (summarizing normative and 
empirical literature on judge's role in plea bargaining). Note, however, that in the federal 
system, as well as some state systems, judges are prohibited or discouraged from 
participating in plea negotiations. See Turner, supra note 5, at 202 ("Under Federal Rule 11, 
judges may not take any part in plea negotiations or even make comments that might 
indirectly influence the bargaining process."). 
17 This direct negotiation phenomenon is particularly important in less serious cases, in 
which there may be no constitutional right to appointed counsel for indigent defendants. See 
Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373 (1979) (holding there is no right to appointed counsel in 
cases in which fine, but not imprisonment, is imposed). Even where the constitutional right 
to appointed legal counsel exists, however, it is common in some jurisdictions for defendants 
to waive the right and negotiate directly with prosecutors. See Mary Sue Backus & Paul 
Marcus, The Right to Counsel in Criminal Cases, A National Crisis, 57 HAsTINGS 
L.J. 1031, 1077-78 (2005) (describing Georgia courts in which, after meeting with prosecutor, 
"every defendant informs the judge that he would like to waive counsel and plead guilty"). 
18 I thus exclude consideration of the phenomenon that some scholars label "implicit plea 
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Field studies of plea bargaining draw an important distinction 
between routine case processing and more adversarial interactions.19 
In routine case processing, cases are resolved quickly, with little or 
no haggling, shortly before or during a routine, preliminary court 
appearance by the defendant, such as arraignment.2° Consider, for 
instance, Milton Heumann's description of practices in Connecticut 
state court: 
Typically, in the circuit court, a line forms outside the 
prosecutor's office the morning before court is convened. 
Defense attorneys shuffle into the prosecutor's office 
and, in a matter of two or three minutes, dispose of the 
one or more cases "set down" that day. Generally, only 
a few words have to be exchanged before agreement is 
reached. The defense attorney mutters something about 
the defendant, the prosecutor reads the police report, 
bargaining." See CANDACE MCCOY, POLITICS AND PLEA BARGAINING: VICTIMS' RIGHTS IN 
CALIFORNIA 52 (1993) ("An implicit plea 'bargain' occurs when a defendant pleads guilty after 
conferring with the defense attorney about the probability of achieving a particular sentence, 
considering the judge's record and temperament. The defendant confesses and expects to 
receive the sentence the judge usually imposes for that type of crime."). 
19 See, e.g., DOUGLAS W. MAYNARD, INSIDE PLEA BARGAINING: THE LANGUAGE OF 
NEGOTIATION 103-18 (1984) (discussing routine and adversarialjustice ). Unfortunately, most 
of the leading academic field studies of plea bargaining were conducted twenty to forty years 
ago. For examples ofthese studies, see generally JAMES EISENSTEIN ET AL., THE CONTOURS 
OF JUSTICE: COMMUNITIES AND THEIR COURTS (1988); MALCOLM M. FEELEY, THE PROCESS Is 
THE PUNISHMENT: HANDLING CASES IN A LOWER CRIMINAL COURT (1979); MILTON HEUMANN, 
PLEA BARGAINING: THE EXPERIENCES OF PROSECUTORS, JUDGES, AND DEFENSE ATTORNEYS 
(1978); and MAYNARD, supra. However, some key observations of the earlier research (e.g., 
the notion of a "going rate" for different offense types and a focus on case categorization 
during "negotiations") also are consistent with the findings of more recent research in other 
jurisdictions. See, e.g., McCOY, supra note 18, at 130-32 (recognizing going rate of 
punishment); Deirdre M. Bowen, An Analysis of Alternative Methods of Plea Bargaining 188 
(2002) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Washington) (on file with author) 
(discussing norms and principles used to arrive at plea bargain); Stacey Thompson Hephner, 
Negotiation: The Strength of the Courtroom Workgroup and the Guilty Plea Process 70 
(2002) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Sam Houston State University) (on file with author) 
(discussing use of"going rates for an offense" and effect on sentencing practices). While plea 
bargaining has undoubtedly been affected by such developments as the widespread adoption 
of sentencing guidelines and mandatory minimums in the 1980s and 1990s, the classic field 
studies remain useful and well regarded repositories of insight. See, e.g., William J. Stuntz, 
Plea Bargaining and Criminal Law's Disappearing Shadow, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2548, 2561 
(2003) (characterizing Heumann's study of plea bargaining in Connecticut in 1970s as "still 
the best account of the practice"). 
20 See HEUMANN, supra note 19, at 35 (describing routine of some courts). 
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and concurrence on "what to do" generally, but not 
always, emerges.21 
As Malcolm Feeley memorably put it, plea bargaining in this mode 
resembles less a Middle Eastern bazaar than shopping in a 
supermarket: 
Arriving at an exchange in this context is not an explicit 
negotiation and bargaining process .... To the extent 
that there is any negotiation at all, it is debate over the 
nature of the case, and hinges largely on establishing 
the relevant "facts" which flow from various 
interpretations ofthe police report, and only occasionally 
involve independent investigation by a defense. In a 
supermarket customers may complain about prices, but 
rarely "bargain" to get them reduced. 22 
This mode of plea bargaining is most closely associated with high-
volume, low-stakes cases like misdemeanors and low-grade felonies, 
as well as cases in which the prosecutor and defense lawyer have a 
good relationship and a long history of past dealings.23 
Many defendants welcome the impersonal, rapid-fire nature of 
the routine case processing mode, preferring just to "get it over 
with" in cases that are unlikely to result in substantial sentences of 
incarceration.24 From a procedural justice standpoint, though, the 
concern is that not all defendants are content with letting the police 
report do the talking for them. 
Even if the report is entirely accurate, the defendant may have 
a "story" to tell that would contextualize the information collected 
by the police. And even if that context is irrelevant to the lawyers' 
assessment ofthe case, it may nonetheless be subjectively important 
to the defendant to tell his or her side of the story. Yet, in the 
routine case processing mode, the defendant may have no 
opportunity to do so until after the prosecutor has decided what the 
21 Id. at 35 (footnotes omitted). 
22 FEELEY, supra note 19, at 187-88. 
23 See Brown & Bunnell, supra note 8, at 1065-66 (discussing conditions permitting quick 
and efficient plea negotiations in federal cases). 
24 FEELEY, supra note 19, at 30-31. 
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plea offer will be (if even then). Given the realities of criminal 
defense-notoriously overburdened public defenders, as well as 
private defense lawyers whose practice economics also demand 
speedy case processing-the defendant's lawyer will rarely spend 
much time with the defendant before an agreement is reached with 
the prosecutor.25 At that point, the pressure will be on the 
defendant simply to consent to the deal without troubling anyone 
with new information.26 In such a case, the defendant would be well 
justified in concluding that he or she has no real voice in the 
process. 
The adversarial mode of plea bargaining raises different 
concerns. In this mode, there is some obstacle to resolving the case 
quickly by reference to shared understandings as to the "worth" of 
various generic case types. 27 When this occurs, the prosecutor may 
assume one or more of a variety of different postures. For instance, 
the prosecutor may adopt a position of principled engagement, 
substantively addressing the defendant's views of the case, either 
accepting the defendant's basic framework for evaluating the case 
or explaining why that framework is not the appropriate one.28 Or 
25 See, e.g., STEVE BOGIRA, COURTROOM 302: A YEAR BEHIND THE SCENES IN AN AMERICAN 
CRIMINAL COURTHOUSE 124 (2005) (describing public defenders' reliance on police reports in 
evaluating cases); Backus & Marcus, supra note 17, at 1033, 1053-57 (describing caseload 
pressures on public defenders). For a classic treatment of the economic pressures that induce 
private counsel to seek quick pleas, see Albert W. Alschuler, The Defense Attorney's Role in 
Plea Bargaining, 84 YALE L.J. 1179, 1182-83, 1198-1203 (1975). Court-appointed attorneys 
may face similar pressures unless they are compensated on an hourly basis. See Alschuler, 
supra, at 1262-63 ("The most satisfactory technique for compensating an appointed attorney 
is probably to pay an established hourly rate."). "Twenty-five or 50 dollars may seem 
seriously inadequate as compensation for defending a person at trial, but some lawyers view 
it as a generous enough reward for conferring with a client for 10 minutes and then standing 
with him in the courtroom to enter a plea of guilty." Id. at 1262. 
26 See, e.g., BOG IRA, supra note 25, at 118 ("Some [public defenders in Chicago] said they 
felt pressured to advise their clients to decide in five minutes whether to plead guilty or not."). 
27 To note just a few potential obstacles, the case may be a manifestly unusual one with 
no clear going rate, there may be a genuine factual disagreement as to what type of case it 
is, or one of the negotiating parties may be a neophyte with unrealistic expectations. 
28 For an example of principled engagement in one courthouse see Douglas Maynard's 
study of plea bargaining in MAYNARD, supra note 19, at 108. The prosecutor in a DUI case 
offered a reduced fine if the defendant pled guilty. Id. In arguing for an even more lenient 
deal, the defendant's lawyer asserted that "[the defendant is] basically not a drinker, urn 
might have a couple of beers once in a while, but she's not really a-she doesn't really drink." 
Id. In response, the prosecutor disputed the factual assertion that the defendant was not a 
"drinker," but implicitly accepted the premise that the defendant's alcohol consumption habits 
were relevant to disposition of the case. See id. (saying "somebody who's not a drinker doesn't 
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the prosecutor may assume a posture of unprincipled acquiescence, 
that is, simple "horse trading," for instance, if a prosecutor responds 
to a defendant's argument for lenience by offering a sentence 
recommendation exactly half-way between the original offer and the 
counter-offer. Alternatively, the prosecutor may respond to 
resistance by withdrawal from negotiations or by threatening to 
penalize the defendant for his or her failure to take the proffered 
deal.29 
From a procedural justice standpoint, the chief concern in the 
adversarial setting is not so much one of voice,30 but rather that, 
outside the principled engagement scenario, the prosecutor 
effectively is saying that the defendant's view of the case does not 
matter; the defendant's perspective is not only wrong, it is not even 
worthy of substantive response. Although the defendant nominally 
has a voice opportunity, that opportunity may seem something of a 
sham. 
It is important to recognize that in the end, regardless of the 
prosecutor's stance in any given case, there will almost certainly be 
a guilty plea.31 Prosecutors can act in a high-handed way because 
few defendants can afford to go to trial. The costs of trial extend far 
beyond the litigation expenses (from which low-income defendants 
are generally insulated anyway). For those who cannot make bail, 
the unpleasantness of pretrial detention may be a very effective 
just go to a liquor store and buy uh pre-made uh cocktails. I think that she is a drinker."). 
Alternatively, the prosecutor's response might be characterized as "engaged." The prosecutor 
could have expressly rejected the defense lawyer's premise on principled grounds and said, 
for instance, "I understand your contention that your client is not a drinker, but that is not 
an element of the offense, and I believe that it is important to ensure there are substantial 
penalties in all DUI cases in order to send a consistent deterrent message." 
29 For instance, in Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 358 (1978), which began as a 
routine bad check case, the prosecutor threatened, and ultimately brought, habitual offender 
charges against the defendant in retaliation for the defendant's refusal to accept the 
prosecutor's initial plea offer. 
30 I say this because there is not likely to be a real dispute unless the defendant is 
offering a view of the case that is at odds with the prosecutor's. There may be voice issues, 
though, if the dispute arises from the views of the defendant's lawyer, and not the defendant 
himself or herself. For instance, such issues may arise if the lawyer is pushing a suppression 
issue that is not of genuine concern to the client, while wholly disregarding the client's legally 
dubious, but keenly felt, entrapment claim. 
31 See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE STATISTICS ONLINE tbl. 5.17.2004, http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t5172004. 
pdf(showing in fiscal year 2004, of 83,391 criminal defendants in federal district court, 72,152 
pled guilty or nolo contendere). 
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deterrent to trial.32 For those who secure pretrial release, there will 
be a desire to draw tedious, inconvenient, and sometimes 
humiliating court appearances to an end. Perhaps most 
importantly, though, it is well recognized that judges routinely 
impose substantial penalties at sentencing on those defendants with 
the temerity to go to trial, sometimes doubling the punishment, or 
worse.33 Thus, many defendants will perceive no realistic 
alternative to whatever the prosecutor offers. 
In any event, we have now preliminarily identified two areas of 
procedural justice concern: the defendant who is railroaded into 
accepting a deal without first having a meaningful opportunity to 
tell his or her side of the story, and the defendant who faces a high-
32 See DAVIDHEILBRONER, ROUGH JUSTICE: DAYSANDNIGHTSOFA YOUNGD.A. 47 (1990) 
(describing judge's use of pointed reminder of potential length of pretrial detention as means 
of inducing defendants to accept plea offers); Bibas, supra note 5, at 2491-93 (noting that in 
misdemeanor and lesser felony cases, many more defendants are held in pretrial custody than 
are sentenced to incarceration after conviction). 
33 It is difficult to quantify the "trial penalty" with precision because of the possibility 
that the characteristics of cases going to trial differ in important ways from those of cases 
being resolved by guilty plea. However, several studies that attempt like-to-like comparisons 
do find quite substantial differences in the sentences imposed after jury trials relative to 
those imposed after guilty pleas. For instance, in one study of sentences imposed for different 
offense types in five states, researchers found "consistent support" for the hypothesis that jury 
trial cases are associated with harsher average sentences than guilty plea cases, including 
a finding of a 350% plea-trial differential in sentence length in heroin distribution cases in 
one state. Nancy J. King et al., When Process Affects Punishment: Differences in Sentences 
After Guilty Plea, Bench Trial, and Jury Trial in Five Guidelines States, 105 COLUM. L. 
REV. 959, 973, 975 (2005). In another empirical study of2,772 cases that resulted in prison 
terms, researchers found that sentences following jury trials were 44.5 months longer than 
those following guilty pleas, after controlling for offense type, criminal justice status at time 
of arrest, prior record, attorney type, geographic location, pretrial status, age, race, and 
gender. See Candace McCoy, Plea Bargaining As Coercion: The Trial Penalty and Plea 
Bargaining Reform, 50 CRIM. L.Q. 67, 88-90 (Z005) (describing comparison of"similar cases"); 
see also Jeffery T. Ulmer & Mindy S. Bradley, Variations in Trial Penalties Among Serious 
Violent Offenders, 44 CRIMINOLOGY 631, 650, 652 (2006) (using Pennsylvania data, finding 
that defendants convicted after jury trial were about 2. 7 times more likely to be incarcerated 
than those convicted after guilty plea, and received sentences fifty-seven percent longer). 
While most empirical studies have found a trial penalty, not all have, which may reflect 
differences in jurisdictions and offense types studied, as well as different definitions of what 
would constitute a trial penalty. For a recent summary ofthe empirical literature, see Ulmer 
& Bradley, supra, at 632-33. In the federal system, the trial penalty has been formalized in 
the sentencing guidelines, which provide a twenty-five to thirty-five percent "discount" for 
defendants who plead guilty. Bibas, supra note 5, at 2489. Of course, as Candace McCoy has 
observed, "The critical point is that almost everyone, including defendants, believe[ s] that [the 
trial penalty exists]." MCCOY, supra note 18, at 164. It is this belief that, whether or not 
empirically verifiable, drives the perceived need to plead guilty. I d. 
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handed prosecutor unwilling to address his or her view of the case 
in a principled fashion. The next Part will explain in more rigorous 
fashion why these scenarios should be avoided--even assuming that 
they do not result in distributively unjust outcomes. 
III. THE CASE FOR PROCEDURAL JUSTICE 
This Part makes the basic case for attending to procedural justice 
in plea bargaining. I rely primarily on the empirical research and 
theorizing of social psychologist Tom Tyler and his collaborators, 
whose work on procedural justice over more than two decades has 
proven immensely influential in the social sciences.34 After a brief 
introduction to Tyler's procedural justice model, I consider how it 
might be translated into the plea bargaining context. Next, I 
discuss difficulties with the pursuit of distributive justice in plea 
bargaining. As we will see, the uncertainty surrounding distributive 
justice in this setting increases the salience of procedural justice. 
Finally, I consider an important collateral benefit of procedural 
justice: enhanced transparency for system outsiders-victims and 
the public at large. 
A. INTRODUCTION TO THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY MODEL 
Tyler's model rests on three interrelated claims. First, a person's 
perception of whether a decisionmaking process was fair does not 
depend solely on the outcome, but also on various attributes of the 
process used to reach the outcome.35 Those attributes include: (1) 
34 See, e.g., RICHARD SPARKS ET AL., PRISONS AND THE PROBLEM OF ORDER 87 (1996) 
(characterizing Tyler's work as "important" and "persuasive[]"); Heuer, supra note 11, at 210 
(stating Tom Tyler and E. Allan Lind's group value theory represents "the most influential 
answer to [the] question" of why opportunity for voice in decisionmaking increases 
perceptions of procedural fairness and satisfaction); Erik Luna, Principled Enforcement of 
Penal Codes, 4 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 515, 575 (2000) ("The most extensive work in this area has 
been done by social psychologist Tom Tyler."); Robert J. MacCoun, Voice, Control, and 
Belonging: The Double-Edged Sword of Procedural Fairness, 1 ANN. REV. L. & Soc. 
Sci. 171, 172 (2005) ("The second decade of procedural justice research centered on the 
remarkably prolific solo and joint efforts of Tom Tyler and Allan Lind .... "). 
35 See TOM R. TYLER & YUEN J. Huo, TRUST IN THE LAW: ENCOURAGING PUBLIC 
COOPERATIONWITHTHEPOLICEANDCOURTS 196 (2002) ("[P]eople's main consideration when 
evaluating the police and the courts is the treatment that they feel people receive from those 
authorities."); Tom R. Tyler, Procedural Justice, Legitimacy, and the Effective Rule of Law, 30 
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whether the person had an opportunity to tell his or her side of the 
story ("voice"); (2) whether the authorities were seen as unbiased, 
honest, and principled ("neutrality"); (3) whether the authorities 
were seen as benevolent and caring ("trustworthiness"); and ( 4) 
whether the person was treated with dignity and respect.36 The 
perception of voice, neutrality, trustworthiness, and respect can 
promote the acceptance of decisions that are otherwise believed to 
be incorrect or substantively unfair. 37 Indeed, in many settings, 
perceptions of process fairness exert greater influence over 
acceptance of the result than do the outcomes themselves. 38 Second, 
the extent to which decisionmaking processes are perceived as fair 
helps shape beliefs regarding the legitimacy of the legal authorities 
responsible for the decision. 39 And third, the perception that legal 
authorities have legitimacy enhances the sense that the authorities 
are entitled to be obeyed.4° Fair procedures thus promote 
CRIME &JUST. 283, 286 (2003) ("[I]ssues of process dominate public evaluations of the police, 
the courts, and social regulatory activities."). 
36 Tom R. Tyler & Hulda Thorisdottir, A Psychological Perspective on Compensation 
for Harm: Examining the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund, 53 DEPAUL L. 
REV. 355, 380 (2003). 
37 Tom R. Tyler & E. Allen Lind, Procedural Justice, in HANDBOOKOFJUSTICERESEARCH 
IN LAw 65, 65 (Joseph Sanders & V. Lee Hamilton eds., 2001). 
38 I d. at 71. Tyler sometimes uses different terms than those employed in this four-factor 
framework. For instance, Tyler and Huo describe acceptance of decisions made by legal 
authorities as a function of two variables: "procedural justice" and "motive-based trust." 
TYLER & Huo, supra note 35, at 76. These two variables, however, are implicit in the four 
factors noted in the text. "Motive-based trust" corresponds to trustworthiness. Compare id. 
at 80 (measuring motive-based trust by reference to questions "Did the authority try to be fair 
to you?" and "Did the authority consider your input in making decisions?"), with Tom R. Tyler, 
The Psychological Consequences of Judicial Procedures: Implications for Civil Commitment 
Hearings, 46 SMU L. REV. 433, 441 (1992) (defining perceived trustworthiness by reference 
to whether authorities "want to treat [people with whom they are dealing] fairly" and 
identifying consideration of arguments as important component of this judgment). 
Meanwhile, Tyler and Huo's notion of procedural justice encompasses voice, neutrality, and 
respect. See TYLER & Huo, supra note 35, at 80 (identifying questions used to assess 
procedural justice in study). In other words, in some studies, Tyler treats trustworthiness 
as a component of procedural justice, see, e.g., Tyler & Thorisdottir, supra note 36, at 380 
(identifying trustworthiness as component of procedural justice), while in others he treats 
procedural justice and trustworthiness as distinct concepts, see, e.g., TYLER & HUO, supra 
note 35, at 76 (treating trustworthiness separately). Because both phenomena are found to 
contribute to the legitimacy and acceptance effects that are of present concern, TYLER & Huo, 
supra note 35, at 76, I group them together in this Article under the single heading of 
"procedural justice" as a convenient shorthand. 
39 Tyler, supra note 35, at 286. 
40 Id. 
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cooperation with the authorities and compliance with their 
directives, as well as the development of a more general sense of 
obligation to obey the law.41 
These three claims are backed, to a greater or lesser extent, by 
three decades of social psychology research, encompassing both 
laboratory and field studies. 42 The studies are too numerous to 
summarize (or even cite) here,43 but a brief description of two 
especially relevant studies will illustrate the nature of the available 
empirical support. In one, Jonathan Casper and his colleagues 
interviewed 628 felony defendants in three cities.44 They found that 
procedural justice in the processing of the defendants' cases made 
a significant contribution to outcome satisfaction.45 They further 
found a significant correlation between defendants' perceptions of 
procedural justice and the amount of time they spent speaking with 
their lawyers (which they associated with voice) and the 
respectfulness of the treatment they received from police officers at 
the time of arrest. 46 In a second criminal justice study, Raymond 
Paternoster and his colleagues gathered information regarding 4 79 
domestic violence arrestees.47 They determined that "[w]hen police 
acted in a procedurally fair manner when arresting assault 
suspects, the rate of subsequent domestic violence was significantly 
lower than when they did not."48 They measured procedural justice 
by reference to such variables as whether officers "took the time" to 
listen to the arrestee's side of the story and whether the arrestee 
was handcuffed in front of the victim (which they related to 
respectful treatment). 49 
41 /d. at 297. 
42 See Tyler & Lind, supra note 37, at 70-71 (discussing research and studies). 
43 See MacCoun, supra note 34, at 172 ("As of early 2005, the Psychlnfo database list[ed] 
almost 700 articles with the phrase 'procedural justice' in the abstract (more than 40 per year 
since 1995 and more than 70 per year in 2000-2003) .... "). As Robert MacCoun observes: 
"Few if any socio-legal topics ... have received as much attention using as many different 
research methods." /d. at 173. For a recent summary of the literature, see id. at 174-88. 
44 Casper et al., supra note 12, at 487-88. 
45 /d. at 494. 
46 /d. at 498. 
47 Paternoster et al., supra note 13, at 175-76. 
48 /d. at 163. 
49 /d. at 177-78. These studies, representative of much of the procedural justice 
research, are admittedly not without their limitations. They are, for instance, correlational 
studies that, despite sophisticated statistical analysis, leave uncertainty as to the key 
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Despite the strong empirical evidence supporting Tyler's model, 
there 1s less certainty as to the underlying psychological 
mechanisms. Tyler himself emphasizes two overlapping 
mechanisms. First, because "people derive much of their social 
identity from their standing as full-fledged members of their group 
or society," fair procedures matter to the extent that they 
communicate positive messages as to social standing.50 Second, 
questions of causation. See MacCoun, supra note 34, at 173-74 (discussing uncertainty about 
causation that exists in field studies). Another difficulty with many studies lies in the 
subjectivity and potential untrustworthiness of self-reported attitudes about procedural 
justice. See Paul G. Chevigny, Fairness and Participation, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1211, 1212 
(1989) ("[S)ubjects who seem to prefer neutral procedures may be expressing political pieties 
to which they think it would be best to appear to subscribe."). It is important to realize, 
though, that procedural justice effects have been identified in a great number of studies 
conducted with diverse methodologies. As Robert MacCoun observed in a recent review of the 
literature, "[T)he sheer heterogeneity of tasks, domains, populations, designs, and analytic 
methods provides remarkable convergence and triangulation." MacCoun, supra note 34, 
at 173. He concluded that "most concerns about the external validity ofthe fair process effect 
(and its antecedents and consequences) have long since been settled." Id.; see also id. at 181 
("There is ample evidence that procedural fairness and legitimacy are correlated, and it is 
almost surely the case that the correlation reflects causation in both directions."). Even 
critics of Tyler have conceded that the evidence in support of key components of his model is 
"persuasive." Chevigny, supra, at 1217. 
Objections to the Tyler model center not on its descriptive accuracy, but rather on the 
possibility that it may be manipulated by authorities to create a "false consciousness," i.e., a 
sense of satisfaction with outcomes that are distributively unjust. See, e.g., MacCoun, supra 
note 34, at 188 ("For many scholars, fair process effects are so robust that they raise the 
specter of'false consciousness'-the Marxist notion that political and market institutions keep 
the proletariat ignorant of capitalism's true nature."); Austin Sarat, Authority, Anxiety, and 
Procedural Justice: Moving from Scientific Detachment to Critical Engagement, 27 LAW & 
Soc'¥ REV. 647,658 (1993) (reviewing TOMR. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (1990)) ("I 
am concerned that behind the thin veil of Tyler's self-proclaimed neutrality is an alliance 
between the study of procedural justice and the project of legitimation itself, between the 
study of why people obey and the effort to provide greater space for the exercise of legal 
power."). The critique is an important one, yet, given the dynamic and uncertain nature of 
what people "really" want by way of outcomes, difficult to assess. See MacCoun, supra 
note 34, at 191 (noting that determining what citizens want from procedure "turns out to be 
surprisingly tricky"). Tyler has acknowledged, but generally sidestepped, the problem. See, 
e.g., Tyler, supra note 35, at 285 ("[T)he model does not address nonnative issues concerning 
whether people ought to defer to legal authorities and generally obey the law .... If the social 
structure is viewed as fundamentally unfair by particular people or groups, then their 
willingness to comply might be regarded as 'false consciousness'-that is, as a willingness 
that should be discouraged. These issues are not addressed here." (citations omitted)). For 
present purposes, I simply will assume that the mandates of the criminal law and criminal 
justice authorities generally ought to be respected and obeyed. 
50 See Tyler & Lind, supra note 37, at 76 ("When one is treated politely and with dignity 
and when respect is shown for one's rights and opinions, feelings of positive standing are 
enhanced. On the other hand, undignified, disrespectful, or impolite treatment by an 
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there is a natural relationship between procedural fairness and 
expectations of fair outcomes over the long run. If, in an initial 
transaction with legal authorities, a person perceives the authorities 
as procedurally fair, then that person is apt to form a judgment that 
the authorities generally act in a fair manner-a judgment that 
might be referred to as a "fairness heuristic."51 Even if the outcome 
in the initial transaction was unfavorable, the expectation that fair 
procedures will be used in the future lends reassurance that 
subsequent transactions are likely to produce fair outcomes, 
promoting a greater sense of security about "the long-term gains 
from group membership,"52 and an enhanced willingness to "invest 
one's resources and identity in an ordered society."53 
B. APPLICATION OF THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY MODEL TO PLEA 
BARGAINING 
1. Negotiation Versus Adjudication. At first blush, plea 
bargaining may not seem a good fit with Tyler's model. Mter all, 
much of the social psychology research focuses on unilateral 
decisions of legal authorities, such as decisions by police officers to 
make an arrest or formal court-based adjudications.54 "Bargaining" 
would seem a very different way of reaching a decision, one in which 
the freedom of each party to veto any proposed agreement might 
plausibly obviate the need for, say, symbolic affirmations of social 
status-respect for individual autonomy would seem intrinsic to the 
transaction. Indeed, influential early research on procedural justice 
suggested that people in disputes place a high value on retaining 
direct control over decisions, indicating that negotiated resolutions 
authority carries the implications that one is not a full member of the group." (citations 
omitted)). 
51 !d. at 76-77. This concept is particularly associated with Tyler's frequent collaborator 
E. Allan Lind. For a more extensive discussion by Lind of the fairness heuristic, see E. Allan 
Lind, Procedural Justice, Disputing, and Reactions to Legal Authorities, in EVERYDAY 
PRACTICES AND TROUBLE CASES 177, 185-88 (Austin Sarat et al. eds., 1998). 
52 Tyler & Lind, supra note 37, at 76. 
53 Id. at 77. 
54 SeeN ancy A. Welsh, Perceptions of Fairness in Negotiation, 87 MARQ. L. REV. 753, 764 
(2004) ("Most of the research that has been done regarding procedural justice has focused on 
people's interactions with third-party authorities in dispute resolution or decision making 
processes (e.g., judges, arbitrators, managers, mediators)."). 
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would generally be preferred on process grounds to adjudication. 55 
This view, however, proved inconsistent with subsequent empirical 
work,56 which instead has tended to emphasize voice and other 
aspects of Tyler's procedural justice model over decision-control per 
se. 57 Indeed, a growing body of work tends to find much the same 
procedural justice dynamic at work in negotiation as in 
adjudication. 58 Even in a relatively high decision-control scenario, 
people still value respectful treatment and a meaningful opportunity 
to tell their side of the story. 
Moreover, it is easy to overstate the extent to which plea 
bargaining really is bargaining. 59 As noted previously, the practice 
often resembles shopping in a supermarket60-with one important 
exception: the dissatisfied defendant is not free to move on to a 
different store in search oflower prices. Even when plea bargaining 
takes on a more adversarial character, there tends to be massive 
power imbalances between prosecutors and defendants. In light of 
such considerations as transaction costs and judicially imposed trial 
penalties, few defendants are willing to go to trial.61 Furthermore, 
the proliferation of sentencing guidelines and mandatory minimum 
sentences over the past quarter-century has given prosecutors even 
greater leverage over defendants than they have traditionally 
enjoyed; when prosecutoriallenience is the only reliable means to 
avoid a draconian sentence, the prosecutor can effectively dictate 
the terms of the "deal."62 Bargaining dynamics vary considerably 
55 See Tyler & Lind, supra note 37, at 74-75 (discussing theory ofThibaut and Walker 
that "disputants define procedural justice in control terms"). 
56 Id. at 75. 
57 Welsh, supra note 54, at 764. 
5s Id. 
59 See Lynch, supra note 4, at 2129 ("[T]he very term 'plea bargaining' is something of a 
misnomer."). 
60 See supra note 22 and accompanying text. 
61 See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text. 
62 Michael M. O'Hear, The Original! ntent of Uniformity in Federal Sentencing, 7 4 U. CIN. 
L. REV. 749, 808 (2006). The Supreme Court softened the harshness of some sentencing 
guidelines systems through its decisions in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), and 
United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), both of which recognized the right of defendants 
to jury fact-finding offactors that increase sentencing exposure. See Booker, 543 U.S. at 231 
(holding that state sentencing scheme violated defendant's rights and that statutory 
maximum must be based solely on facts reflected in jury verdict or admitted by defendant); 
Blakely, 542 U.S. at 303 ("[T]he 'statutory maximum' ... is the maximum sentence a judge 
may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the 
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from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, but, in many, Gerard Lynch's 
characterization of plea bargaining would be apt: administrative 
justice has replaced adversarial and the prosecutor now occupies the 
primary role in adjudicating guilt and setting punishments.63 In 
plea bargaining, then, the prosecutor may be perceived by 
defendants less as a negotiating partner and more as the key 
decisionmaker. 
In short, there are good reasons to suspect that the procedural 
justice effects documented in so many other settings do, indeed, 
apply to the decisions of prosecutors in making and responding to 
plea offers. 
2. Translating Procedural Justice Into Plea Bargaining Process 
Norms. As indicated above, the Tyler model identifies four factors 
as attributes of procedural justice: voice, neutrality, 
trustworthiness, and respect. 64 How might these factors be 
translated into plea bargaining practice? Let us consider each in 
turn. 
Defendants have voice to the extent they perceive an opportunity 
to tell their side of their story. Interestingly, some research 
suggests that voice matters even if the opportunity to be heard does 
not occur until after the relevant decision has been made.65 Voice 
effects are greater, however, if the opportunity to be heard is 
provided earlier in the process.66 Prosecutors should thus ensure 
such an opportunity is available before presenting an offer to a 
defendant. 
defendant."). Mandatory minimums, however, are exempted from this rule. See Harris v. 
United States, 536 U.S. 545, 565 (2002) ("[T]he facts guiding judicial discretion below the 
statutory maximum need not be alleged in the indictment, submitted to the jury, or proved 
beyond a reasonable doubt."). Moreover, even after the federal guidelines were converted 
from mandatory to advisory in Booker, federal judges continued to follow them with nearly 
the same frequency as before. See Michael M. O'Hear, The Duty to Avoid Disparity: 
Implementing 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6) After Booker, 37 MCGEORGE L. REV. 627, 645 (2006) 
(describing Booker decision and noting that guidelines compliance and overall sentencing 
severity have not dramatically changed since Booker was decided). 
63 See Lynch, supra note 4, at 2124,2132 (noting defendant's options are limited because 
of disparity in power so that defendant likely will take whatever prosecutor offers). 
64 See supra note 36 and accompanying text. 
65 See MacCoun, supra note 34, at 192-93 (concluding fairness judgments are enhanced 
even when there is no chance of influencing decision). 
66 Id. at 192. 
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One common method for prosecutors to learn the defendant's side 
of the story is through police reports. Police, however, are not 
always diligent about collecting the defendant's side of the story.67 
Moreover, defendants may not think much of their opportunity to be 
heard by the police. Their "hearing," for instance, may have 
occurred in an emotionally charged arrest context, or may have been 
colored by coercive or deceptive police practices. Thus, a serious 
commitment to voice cannot be satisfied ·through an uncritical 
reliance on police reports.68 
Instead, before making a plea offer, the prosecutor should 
affirmatively ascertain whether the defendant had a meaningful 
opportunity to convey his or her side of the story, either through 
appropriately sensitive police processes or through an attorney. 
Thus, for instance, in cases in which police documentation does not 
indicate meaningful voice opportunities, the prosecutor should dig 
a little deeper, refraining from plea negotiations until after he or she 
has discussed the matter with the officers involved or has provided 
the defendant with a meaningful voice opportunity through 
counsel.69 And, to the extent that counsel is regarded as the 
guarantor of defendant voice, plea negotiations should wait until 
after the defendant and the lawyer have conferred for more than 
just a few moments in a crowded holding pen or the back of a noisy 
67 See Paternoster et al., supra note 13, at 177 (describing study that asked arrestees: 
"Did the [police] officers take the time to listen to your side of the story?"). 
68 That said, even such an uncritical reliance might be a procedural justice improvement 
in some jurisdictions. For instance, a recent field study of plea negotiations in one busy urban 
court found that prosecutors made their initial judgment of the worth of each case based 
solely on information contained on the outside of the case file, consisting primarily of the 
charge, the defendant's criminal history, and the name of the defendant's attorney. See 
Hephner, supra note 19, at 57 (describing study). Moreover, "[d]ue to the large volume of 
cases the prosecutors viewed on a daily basis, this folder was often the only acquaintance a 
prosecutor had with a defendant until the plea was agreed to or until a trial date was set." 
I d. 
69 Encouraging police to collect statements from defendants is not, of course, without risk 
to defendants who have a tendency to incriminate themselves when given an opportunity. 
See Anemona Hartcollis, Remain Silent? Some in Custody Spell It All Out, N.Y. TIMES, 
Jan. 5, 2007, at A1 (describing colorful examples of incriminating information supplied by 
defendants on standard disclosure forms). Indeed, savvier defendants, fearful of making an 
inadvertent damaging admission, might distrust voice opportunities provided by the police. 
In order to help defendants feel more comfortable with their voice opportunities, it may be 
helpful to treat these opportunities as privileged communications, much as Federal Rule of 
Evidence 410 offers protection for statements made during plea negotiations. See FED. R. 
EVID. 410 (stating rule on inadmissibility of statements made during negotiations). 
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courtroom, as is the norm for indigent defendants in some 
jurisdictions. 70 In support of this view, one might recall Casper's 
finding of a significant correlation between defendant perceptions 
of procedural justice and the amount of time simply spent talking 
with a lawyer.71 
Neutrality is associated with a decisionmaker who is unbiased, 
honest, and principled. 72 Most prosecutors doubtlessly believe they 
are neutral, but the trick is to reassure defendants of this. Tyler 
identifies the use of objective criteria as an important means by 
which a decisionmaker can establish his or her neutrality. 73 
Decisions, moreover, should be explained so as to demonstrate that 
a neutral process was followed. 74 In the plea bargaining context, 
then, prosecutors might enhance procedural justice by adopting 
objective criteria to guide their decisions 75 and explaining to 
70 See Backus & Marcus, supra note 17, at 1033-34 ("[I]n Broward County, Florida, the 
elected public defender felt compelled last year to forbid his attorneys from advising indigent 
criminal defendants to plead guilty unless they have had 'meaningful contact' with their 
clients in advance. . . . [He stated,] 'It's not fair to make life-altering decisions while 
handcuffed to a chair with fifty people standing around.'"). 
71 See Casper et al., supra note 12, at 498 (finding that amount of time defendant spent 
with his or her attorney is positively related to reports of procedural fairness). In addition 
to time pressures, there is another difficulty with relying on counsel as a voice intermediary: 
what to do in cases in which the defendant wishes to tell a story that is counterproductive to 
his or her own best interests, at least as judged by defense counsel. Imagine, for instance, 
that in a close "reasonable doubt" case, the defendant wants to admit that he committed the 
crime but argue that the victim "had it coming." Assuming that the victim's conduct does not 
give rise to a valid legal defense, the lawyer is in quandary: telling the defendant's story to 
the prosecutor likely will not strengthen the defendant's position, and even if the admission 
cannot later be used against the defendant in court, it may harm the defendant by 
undermining the lawyer's efforts to depict him or her in a sympathetic light during plea 
negotiations. From a procedural justice standpoint, the defendant's desire for voice perhaps 
can be reasonably well satisfied by an opportunity simply to tell his or her story to a lawyer, 
particularly if the lawyer then explains why it might be harmful to repeat the story to the 
prosecutor and ultimately leaves the decision up to the defendant. 
72 See Tyler & Thorisdottir, supra note 36, at 380 (relating neutrality with lack of bias, 
honesty, and principled decisionmaking). 
73 Tyler, supra note 35, at 298. 
74 See id. (stating openness and explanation tend to show evidence of neutrality). 
75 Gary Lowenthal describes the adoption of such criteria by the Maricopa County 
Attorney in Arizona: line prosecutors were required to seek a prison sentence "for every 
defendant who displayed a gun or knife in the commission of a crime," and prohibited from 
reducing residential burglaries from felonies to misdemeanors. GARY LOWENTHAL, DOWN AND 
DIRTY JUSTICE: A CHILLING JOURNEY INTO THE DARK WORLD OF CRIME AND THE CRIMINAL 
COURTS 39 (2003). A somewhat more nuanced set of criteria would be preferable. See infra 
notes 164-78 and accompanying text. Indeed, the procedural justice concerns discussed here 
would provide further support for the sort of prosecutorial guidelines that long have been of 
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. defendants why they take the positions they do. Explanations ought 
to be conveyed through defense counsel, but, recognizing that busy 
counsel may not effectively convey the information, prosecutors also 
should explain their reasoning in open court when the defendant is 
physically present to offer his or her guilty plea.76 
People infer trustworthiness when they believe "that the 
authorities with whom they are dealing are concerned about their 
welfare and want to treat them fairly."77 Perceived trustworthiness 
is enhanced when the authorities demonstrate that they have 
actually considered the information offered during voice 
opportunities.78 Thus, in the plea bargaining context, when 
explaining his or her positions, the prosecutor should expressly 
address any claims asserted by the defendant in support of more 
lenient treatment,79 that is, provide what was termed "principled 
engagement" above.80 
Perceptions of respect are associated with simple politeness by 
the authorities, as well as the acknowledgement of citizens' legal 
interest to academics as a counterweight to sentencing guidelines. See Ronald F. Wright, 
Sentencing Commissions As Provocateurs of Prosecutorial Self-Regulation, 105 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1010, 1012 (2005) (discussing how academics "have looked optimistically to prosecutorial 
guidelines as the next frontier for sentencing commissions to explore"). I provide a more 
detailed proposal for the use of prosecutorial guidelines so as to enhance perceptions of 
procedural justice in Michael M. O'Hear, Plea Bargaining and Victims: From Consultation 
to Guidelines, 91 MARQ. L. REv. (forthcoming 2007)(manuscript at 9-13, on file with author), 
available at http://pa pers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm ?abstract_id= 100537 3. 
76 To be sure, explanations do not always make decisions more palatable, and may 
sometimes have the reverse effect. An adverse decision that is poorly justified may leave a 
worse impression than an entirely unexplained decision for which it may be possible to 
imagine a good explanation. Consider, for instance, the defendant's response when a 
prosecutor justifies a less-than-generous plea offer by reference to vague rumors that the 
defendant belongs to a street gang-rumors that the defendant knows to be false and 
malicious. In such a case, the defendant's respect for the system might actually be higher if 
plea-bargaining remained within the proverbial black box. On the other hand, in the black 
box scenario, defendants may be unlikely to give prosecutors the benefit of the doubt and to 
assume that some good explanation lies behind an adverse decision. Moreover, given a need 
to provide a public justification for the plea offer, prosecutors presumably will tend to avoid 
explanations that are facially implausible, readily demonstrated to rest on false premises, or 
lacking a rational connection to the recognized purposes of the criminal justice system. 
77 Tyler, supra note 38, at 441. 
78 See id. ("Without considering their arguments, people believe that the authority cannot 
be acting benevolently .... "). 
79 See Tyler & Thorisdottir, supra note 36, at 383 ("But people do need to feel that their 
views have been actively considered. Authorities can facilitate such feelings by accounting 
for their decisions in the respondent's own terms."). 
80 See supra note 28 and accompanying text. 
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rights. 81 In the plea bargaining context, prosecutors might 
undertake a number of measures to enhance perceptions of respect. 
They might, for instance, take care to use the appropriate honorific 
when referring to the defendant (e.g., Mr. Smith, Ms. Jones) and 
discourage unnecessary handcuffing and other forms of rough 
treatment. 82 They also should avoid exploding offers that expire 
before defendants have had a meaningful opportunity to confer with 
counsel or to litigate colorable suppression motions as such offers 
convey a disregard for the defendants' legal rights. Finally, after 
formal charges have been filed, prosecutors should avoid threats of 
enhanced charges in order to extract guilty pleas. 83 A guilty plea 
represents the waiver of numerous constitutional rights, including 
the right to a jury trial and the privilege against self-
incrimination. 84 A prosecutor shows disrespect for these rights 
when she threatens a recalcitrant defendant with charges that she 
evidently did not think appropriate to pursue in the first instance.85 
81 See Tyler, supra note 38, at 440 (stating people respond to "whether they are treated 
with respect, politeness, and dignity, and whether their rights as citizens are acknowledged"). 
82 Such basic forms of respectful treatment of criminal defendants are more routinely 
observed in other Western nations. See JAMES Q. WHITMAN, HARSH JUSTICE: CRIMINAL 
PuNISHMENT AND THE WIDENING DIVIDE BETWEEN AMERICA AND EUROPE 8 (2003) (discussing 
France and Germany's commitment to giving criminal offenders respect and dignity). 
83 For a well-known example of a case in which a prosecutor did so, see Bordenkircher v. 
Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 358 (1978). In some jurisdictions, the use of such threats seems to be 
common. See, e.g., MCCOY, supra note 18, at 180 (noting lawyers' observation that threats 
of charging under California habitual offender law were "often used in plea bargaining to 
elicit a quick guilty plea"). Indeed, charging threats have been effectively institutionalized 
in some prosecutors' offices. For instance, in King County, Washington, the policy is to 
charge conservatively at first: the prosecutor's office "only files charges on the offense that 
it is quite confident it can win at trial, does not add additional charges just because the facts 
may allow for it, and does not add enhancements." Bowen, supra note 19, at 78. If the 
defendant does not plead guilty quickly, though, additional charges and enhancements are 
filed in preparation for trial. Id. at 79. For instance, in drug dealing cases, school bus zone 
sentence enhancements generally are sought only against defendants who choose not to 
accept the prosecutor's take-it-or-leave-it plea proposal. Id. at 97. 
84 See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 (1969) (stating guilty pleas involve waiver 
of certain constitutional rights). 
85 Robert Scott and William Stuntz have a wonderful analogy for Bordenkircher, the 
leading charging threat case, that nicely captures this aspect of the prosecutor's actions: 
The ... analogy is ... the lone gas station in the middle of the desert that 
charges fifty dollars for a gallon of gas. Like the prosecutor in 
Bordenkircher, the gas station usually gets its asking price, because the 
difference between that price and the cost of going without (death in the 
desert) is so high .... Imagine, however, that the gas station owner goes 
further. Figuring that the buyer will kick and scream and haggle for an 
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In sum, it is not hard to imagine a number of conceptually simple 
protocols that could be implemented by prosecutors in order to 
enhance defendants' perceptions of procedural justice: (1) before 
starting plea negotiations, ensure that defendants have had a 
meaningful opportunity to tell their side of the story, either through 
police officers during pre-charge processing or through counsel after 
charging; (2) develop objective criteria to guide plea negotiations; (3) 
explain positions taken in negotiations; (4) expressly acknowledge 
arguments for more lenient treatment; and (5) refrain from pressure 
tactics like exploding offers and charging threats. These five 
measures will be referred to here as the "procedural justice norms" 
in plea bargaining. I leave for Part IV, below, a consideration of the 
potential costs of these norms, which, as we will see, may have 
important implications for the way that they are implemented.86 
Before moving on, one additional matter should be addressed: 
whether defendants ought to be given a remedy for violations of the 
procedural justice norms. Because there is little experience in this 
country with enforceable rules of charging or plea bargaining, 87 it is 
difficult to know to what extent enforceability would contribute to 
prosecutorial compliance, on the one hand, or give rise to costly 
disruptions in case processing, on the other. The answers, in fact, 
may vary significantly by jurisdiction, depending, for instance, on 
the culture and organization of each prosecutor's office. 88 In the end, 
the enforceability issues require considerably more experimentation 
and empirical analysis.89 For present purposes, I will assume that 
hour, but will eventually agree to the seller's price, the seller decides to 
cut the negotiation short by letting the air out of the buyer's tires and 
offering to refill the tires if, but only if, the buyer pays the seller's asking 
price for gas. 
Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 YAL:E:L.J. 1909,1964 
(1992). 
86 See infra notes 153-90 and accompanying text. 
87 Perhaps the most notable example is New Jersey's "Brimage guidelines." See Ronald 
F. Wright, Prosecutorial Guidelines and the New Terrain in New Jersey, 109 PENN ST. L. 
REV. 1087, 1097 (2005) (noting how attorney general "reined in the available plea offers and 
limited the factors considered during plea negotiations" in New Jersey). 
88 For a general description of approaches to internal governance and policy enforcement 
in prosecutor offices, see ROY B. FLEMING ET AL., THE CRAFT OF JUSTICE: POLITICS AND WORK 
IN CRIMINAL COURT COMMUNITIES 56-59 (1992). 
89 The difficulties are illustrated by the experience with the U.S. Department of Justice's 
internal guidance documents for federal prosecutors. Lacking judicial enforcement 
mechanisms, some of the Department's guidelines have been "repeatedly violated." See Ellen 
432 GEORGIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42:407 
procedural justice norms could be effectively implemented by most 
prosecutors' offices through routine methods ofinternal training and 
supervision, without a need to devise special enforcement 
mechanisms. 90 
3. Salience of Procedural Justice Effects to Criminal Law. While 
theorists continue to debate the proper purposes of criminal 
punishment, there can be little doubt that the contemporary 
American criminal justice system embraces crime control as a 
central, if not the central, objective.91 With this overarching 
objective in mind, this Part will consider how implementation of the 
procedural justice norms may contribute to the effectiveness of the 
criminal justice system. Before proceeding, though, it may be 
helpful to distinguish more clearly between two levels at which 
procedural justice is believed to operate. In Tyler's model, 
procedural justice enhances both compliance with specific, 
individualized directives oflegal authorities (for instance, the orders 
included in a final judgment entered in a particular criminal case) 
and compliance more generally with the legal system and its 
requirements (for instance, the general requirement that citizens 
obey the dictates of a jurisdiction's criminal code). 92 
S. Podgor, Department of Justice Guidelines: Balancing "Discretionary Justice," 13 CORNELL 
J.L. & PuB. POL 'y 167, 176-85 (2004) (discussing reported violations of Petite Policy, grand 
jury advisement policy, and guidelines on presentation of exculpatory evidence to grandjury). 
Yet, even some critics of the Department's compliance history concede that the existing 
guidelines structure "serve[s] important interests of educating new personnel in the office, 
providing consistency within offices, and also providing a structure for important internal 
policy decisions." Id. at 194. Thus, the development of" 'soft' remedies" may be preferred to 
"strict judicial oversight and correction," which might lead the Department to get out of the 
guidelines business altogether. !d. at 195. 
9° Cf Luna, supra note 34, at 603-05 (advocating adoption by police and prosecutors of 
clear principles to guide exercise of law enforcement discretion, but without judicial 
enforcement). 
91 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) (2000) (requiring that, at sentencing, federal judges 
consider need for sentence imposed in order to, inter alia, "promote respect for the law," 
"afford adequate deterrence," and "protect the public from further crimes of the defendant"); 
N.Y. PENAL LAW§ 1.05(6) ( Consol. 2007) (establishing societal protection, rehabilitation, and 
deterrence as purposes of penal sanctions); see also Richard S. Frase, State Sentencing 
Guidelines: Diversity, Consensus, and Unresolved Policy Issues, 105 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1190, 1206 (2005) ("Although [sentencing] guidelines are often viewed as deliberately, 
and perhaps inherently, designed to emphasize retributive goals of proportionality and 
uniformity, all state guideline reforms, even at their inception, have also given substantial 
weight to crime control purposes."). 
92 See Tyler, supra note 35, at 283-84 (arguing that process-based model of regulation 
encourages general and specific legal compliance). 
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The criminal justice system depends on voluntary compliance by 
defendants at both levels. Consider first the level of individualized 
directives. It may seem odd to suggest that there is something 
important about voluntary defendant compliance with the 
judgments reached in criminal cases. Mter all, the criminal justice 
system has at its disposal the state's most powerful tools of coercion: 
an army of police officers, all manner of sophisticated investigative 
tools and techniques, laws threatening severe penalties for 
noncompliance, and of course, a capacious network of unpleasant 
jails and prisons. Yet, the system does require high levels of 
compliance to reach its aspirations. We can see this need most 
clearly in cases that result in a sentence of probation. 
Probation plays an integral role in the criminal justice system; at 
any given time many more defendants are on probation than in jail 
or prison. 93 Probation is almost invariably conditioned on the 
defendant doing certain things (e.g., undergoing treatment for 
addiction, participating in other rehabilitative programming, 
submitting to regular drug testing, or performing community 
service) and not doing others (e.g., avoiding contact with other 
convicts, avoiding contact with victims, or not engaging in further 
criminal conduct).94 These conditions generally are not arbitrary, 
but are instead easily connected to important, express purposes of 
the criminal justice system: crime prevention, rehabilitation, and 
just punishment.95 Yet, probation conditions frequently are 
violated.96 This gives rise to two important problems. First, to the 
extent that violations go undetected or unsanctioned by 
authorities-an occurrence believed to be quite common given the 
93 See LAUREN E. GLAZE & SERI PALLA, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PROBATION AND PAROLE 
IN THE UNITED STATES, 2004, at 1, available at http://www.ojp.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/ppus04.pdf 
(2005) (showing at end of 2004, more than four million offenders were on probation, while 
number in jail or prison was just over two million). 
94 See 18 U.S.C. § 3563 (2000) (listing mandatory and discretionary conditions of federal 
probation); HOWARD ABADINSKY, PROBATION AND PAROLE: THEORY AND PRACTICE 109-12 (3d 
ed. 1987) (discussing standard conditions of probation). 
95 See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) (2000) (listing purposes of punishment in federal cases); 
ABADINSKY, supra note 94, at 130 ("In general, the courts can impose any conditions of 
probation that are reasonably related to the rehabilitation of the offender ... or the protection 
of the community .... "). 
96 See GLAZE & PALLA, supra note 93, at 6 (indicating that only sixty percent of people 
discharged from probation in 2004 successfully met conditions of their supervision). 
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inadequacy of resources devoted to supervision97-the underlying 
purposes of the conditions are defeated. Second, to the extent that 
violations are detected and sanctioned, the processes for doing so 
consume scarce criminal justice resources, especially when the 
offender is sent to prison as a result of the violation.98 Both 
problems would be diminished by enhanced voluntary compliance 
with probation conditions. 
Even with respect to sentences of incarceration, compliance is a 
matter of substantial concern, for reasons going well beyond the 
potential for defendants to abscond. Prisons are not places of 
unlimited coercion and control. 99 Violent disturbances remind us of 
this in particularly dramatic form, 100 as do pervasive problems of 
substance abuse among the incarcerated. 101 Prisons, particularly 
outside the maximum security setting, provide varying, and not 
insignificant, levels of autonomy. 102 This state of affairs seems 
inevitable, not only as a result of resource constraints, 103 but also as 
a result of the need to prepare most inmates eventually to reenter 
free society. Indeed, the vocational training and other rehabilitative 
programming available in many prisons would be of little value if 
prisoners failed to accept their sentences, persistently resisted 
prison authorities, and required constant, close supervision. 104 In 
short, without significant measures of acceptance and voluntary 
97 ABADINSKY, supra note 94, at 108. 
98 See id. at 121-26 (describing typical probation revocation process). 
99 See SPARKS ET AL., supra note 34, at 303 ("Prison staff are in fact frequently rather 
keenly aware of the need to tailor their actions, demeanour, and demands in recognition of 
prisoners' customary expectations-and their capacity to resist."). 
100 See Anthony E. Bottoms, Interpersonal Violence and Social Order in Prisons, in 
PRISONS 205, 226 (Michael Tonry & Joan Petersilia eds., 1999) (collecting data on homicide 
in prison). 
101 See Chase Riveland, Prison Management Trends, 1975-2025, in PRISONS, supra 
note 100, at 163, 187 ("Any candid prison administrator ... will admit that the effort to 
control illegal substances ... is unending."). 
102 See Bottoms, supra note 100, at 272 ("From one perspective, being a prisoner among 
prisoners is a lifestyle that requires continual choices."). 
103 See id. at 210 ("[(]]n most day-to-day situations) prisoners heavily outnumber prison 
officers; and ... to many prisoners, the incentives or disincentives ... that the prison system 
offers have little real meaning."). 
104 See Gerald G. Gaes et al., Adult Correctional Treatment, in PRISONS, supra note 100, 
at 361 (discussing wide range of treatment programs in use); Riveland, supra note 101, at 179 
(noting importance of mental health treatment in prison and potential value of cognitive 
therapy, anger management, and substance abuse treatment programs recently adopted in 
many prisons). 
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compliance, there seems little likelihood that prisons can accomplish 
their objectives of maintaining a safe, orderly environment and 
preparing prisoners for successful reentry to society. 105 
Compliance also matters in the second, more general sense of an 
internalized feeling of obligation to obey the law and cooperate with 
legal authorities. Such an attitude plainly furthers crime-reduction 
goals. To be sure, much of the political rhetoric surrounding crime 
control in recent years has emphasized the coercive strategies of 
deterrence and incapacitation, in lieu of the value-internalization 
suggested by Tyler. 106 Yet, neither the public nor the legal system 
has ever entirely abandoned hope in rehabilitation.107 For instance, 
parole, which is premised on rehabilitation, 108 continues to play a 
central role in the criminal justice systems of many states. 109 
Moreover, much evidence suggests a resurgence of interest in 
rehabilitative approaches.110 The widespread embrace of drug 
treatment courts and victim-offender mediation programs across the 
nation, for instance, evinces a desire for alternatives to the heavy-
handed threats embodied in so much "get-tough" sentencing 
legislation of the 1980s and 1990s.111 In short, retribution and 
105 Interestingly, precisely these sorts of concerns were an important motivating factor 
behind the adoption of the federal sentencing guidelines in the 1980s; it was believed that 
anger over unfair sentences contributed to prison violence and impaired rehabilitation. 
O'Hear, supra note 62, at 763-64, 773. 
106 See, e.g., FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING ET AL., PuNISHMENT AND DEMOCRACY: THREE STRIKES 
AND YOU'RE OUT IN CALIFORNIA 91 (2001) (identifying incapacitation as initial purpose of 
California's "three strikes" law adopted in 1994); O'Hear, supra note 62, at 787 (identifying 
deterrence as chief purpose of federal sentencing reforms adopted in 2003). 
107 See Joan Petersilia, Parole and Prisoner Reentry in the United States, in PRISONS, 
supra note 100, at 479, 518 ("Recent research reveals that the public favors both punishing 
and treating criminals ... . ");see also id. at 518-22 (discussing several recent parole reform 
initiatives that offer enhanced social services for parolees). 
108 I d. at 482-83. Parole traditionally has provided job assistance, family counseling, and 
chemical dependency programs, although such programs have tended to suffer from budget 
cuts in recent years. Id. at 483. 
109 Although the long-term trend has been towards discontinuing or restricting the 
availability of parole release, most states retain parole in some form. See id. at 496 (providing 
state-by-state data). Indeed, several states that "abolished" parole later reestablished it or 
an equivalent. Id. at 482. 
110 Michael Tonry, Obsolescence and Immanence in Penal Theory and Policy, 105 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1233, 1252-54 (2005); see also Vincent Schiraldi & Judith Greene, Reducing 
Correctional Costs in an Era of Tightening Budgets and Shifting Public Opinion, 14 FED. 
SENT'G REP. 332, 332-33 (2002) (discussing public opinion with respect to prevention, 
rehabilitation, and sentencing). 
m See Michael M. O'Hear, Federalism and Drug Control, 57 V AND. L. REV. 783, 823-25 
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deterrence in and of themselves do not provide anything close to a 
complete account of American criminal justice today. Assuming that 
it does advance crime control objectives, there is no reason to believe 
that Tyler's legitimacy-based model is fundamentally incompatible 
with the spirit and purpose of our criminal justice system. 
Thus far, I have offered what the theorists would call a 
consequentialist defense of procedural justice in plea bargaining. 
However, there are those who reject consequentialism in favor of 
deontological approaches to criminal justice.112 While mounting a 
full-blown deontological defense of procedural justice is beyond the 
scope of this Article, I suggest a couple of reasons why even those in 
the deontological camp might regard my proposed proceduraljustice 
norms-if not my underlying reasoning-with sympathy. First, for 
one who views the criminal justice system's overriding purpose as 
the identification of, and imposition of just punishment on, the 
morally culpable, there must be some appreciation of more robust 
procedure from its accuracy-enhancing standpoint. For instance, 
defendant voice may help to produce timely information that 
prevents wrongful convictions or disproportionate punishments. 113 
Indeed, the classic deontological critique of a deterrence-based 
criminal law is that deterrence theory is said to be overly accepting 
of punishments imposed on the factually innocent.114 Second, even 
to the extent that procedural justice fails to advance accuracy 
interests, those favoring a deontological approach may nonetheless 
be receptive to arguments for procedural reform that are themselves 
grounded in theories of political morality. A full elaboration of this 
approach will have to await another day, but one may indeed find 
considerable support for at least some aspects of the proposed plea 
bargaining norms in the Kantian tradition of political theorizing. 115 
(2004) (discussing drug treatment courts); MarkS. Umbreit et al., Restorative Justice in the 
Twenty-First Century: A Social Movement Full of Opportunities and Pitfalls, 89 MARQ. L. 
REV. 251, 259-61 (2005) (discussing victim-offender mediation). 
uz In criminal law scholarship, the deontological approach centers on the retributive view 
that "punishment is justified solely because the person being punished deserves it." Russell 
L. Christopher, Deterring Retributivism: The Injustice of"Just" Punishment, 96 Nw. U. L. 
REV. 843, 845 n.1 (2002). 
ua See infra notes 186-90 and accompanying text. 
114 Christopher, supra note 112, at 848. 
115 Jerry Mashaw's dignitary theory of process is perhaps the most influential and well-
developed effort to ground procedural rights in the liberal tradition of political morality. 
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We should not, in short, regard procedural justice in plea bargaining 
as a lost cause even on the deontological side of the great divide in 
criminal law theory. 
C. DOUBTS ABOUT DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE 
If the demands of distributive justice were reasonably 
determinate, we might justifiably decide to prioritize these demands 
over those of procedural justice.U6 Indeed, Tyler himself has 
suggested that the fairness heuristic effect-that is, the tendency of 
people to rely on procedural justice judgments in one transaction as 
a cognitive shortcut to predict whether outcomes in future 
Mashaw begins with a basic moral premise of individual autonomy: "Each citizen is an end 
in himself, not merely a means for the attainment of collective ends. The government cannot, 
therefore, pursue its purposes through processes which ignore the independent status and 
purposes of the individual." JERRY L. MAsHAW, DUE PROCESS IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE 
STATE 45 (1985). Arising from this premise, Mashaw identifies comprehensibility of 
government action as a fundamental process value in a liberal democracy. Id. at 172-73. 
Dovetailing with Tyler's procedural justice model, Mashaw's notion of comprehensibility 
encompasses "reason giving'' (explanation) as an important obligation of government 
decisionmakers. See id. at 176, 199 ("[R]eason giving confirms the participant, even in the 
face of substantive disappointment, as engaging in an ongoing process of rational and self-
regarding action."). Mashaw also notes the value of individual participation (voice) in the 
decisionmaking process, albeit in a more qualified fashion. See id. at 178, 200 (discussing role 
of participation in contributing to individual self-respect). For another effort to establish a 
Kantian foundation for explanation and voice, see Edmund Pincoffs, Due Process, Fraternity, 
and a Kantian Injunction, in DUE PROCESS: NOMOS XVIII, at 172, 175-79 (J. Roland Pennock 
& John W. Chapman eds., 1977). 
Markus Dirk Dubber has suggested a similar argument specifically in the plea 
bargaining context, identifying a deep tension between plea bargaining as commonly 
practiced in the United States and the basic Enlightenment project oflegitimizing criminal 
punishment through procedures that show respect for the defendant's moral autonomy. See 
Dubber, supra note 5, at 591-92, 595-96 (discussing reformation of plea bargaining). He 
notes with interest the arguments of some German scholars that more robust participation 
by the defendant might render plea bargaining "consistent with the autonomy of the accused," 
and thus better legitimize the practice. Id. at 604-05. 
For a more detailed argument that the ends of retributive and procedural justice may 
be viewed in a complementary way, see O'Hear, supra note 75, manuscript at 6-8. 
116 By "distributive justice," I refer generally to the justness of outcomes. See Casper et 
al., supra note 12, at 486 (establishing perception of outcome justness as affecting defendants' 
overall perception of courtroom experience). In the criminal law context, it is perhaps more 
conventional (though hardly universal) to use the term "retributive justice" as a way of 
describing preferred outcomes. However, because this term implies a particular theory of 
punishment that may not be broadly accepted, I prefer a more open-ended term that is 
intended to encompass whatever may be the preferred measure of the justness of outcomes. 
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transactions will generally be fair117-rests precisely on the 
indeterminacy of distributive justice relative to procedural justice. 118 
Consistent with this hypothesis, empirical research suggests that 
procedural justice effects in criminal trials are considerably less 
where the defendant's guilt or innocence is clear than where the 
correct verdict is in doubt.119 In light of such research, if we had a 
high degree of confidence in the justice of plea-bargained outcomes, 
then we might find procedural justice a matter of comparatively 
little concern. 
But how should we evaluate the outcomes? There would likely 
be broad consensus as to at least one distributive principle: plea 
bargaining should not result in the conviction of the factually 
innocent. This one principle, though, supplies little meaningful 
guidance in the great run of cases in which the factual elements of 
the defendant's guilt of something are readily satisfied. Troubling 
distributive justice questions pervade such cases. In expansive 
criminal codes with many overlapping offenses, what is the correct 
offense or offenses of conviction? What should be done in cases in 
which the defendant, though factually guilty, might nonetheless 
plausibly win acquittal as a result of the suppression of key evidence 
or jury nullification? Should sentencing be addressed in the plea 
agreement, and, if so, how?120 
117 See Tyler & Lind, supra note 37, at 76-77; see also supra notes 51-53 and 
accompanying text. 
118 Tyler & Lind, supra note 37, at 80 ("Most people are ... much better at perceiving 
whether they are being treated impolitely than they are at interpreting whether the fine they 
received or the judgment handed down in their lawsuit is fair."). 
119 Linda J. Skitka & David A. Houston, When Due Process Is of No Consequence: Moral 
Mandates and Presumed Defendant Guilt or Innocence, 14 Soc. JUST. RES. 305, 315-16 (2001); 
see also Heuer, supra note 11, at 221 (discussing studies indicating that disrespectful 
treatment may be perceived as fair response to inappropriate behavior). 
120 Viewing plea bargains as consensual transactions, one might argue that their 
voluntariness per se satisfies the requirements of distributive justice. However, this 
perspective disregards the interests of third parties such as victims, the community, the 
defendant's family, and so forth, whose consent is not required to consummate a plea deal. 
To be sure, the judge may attend to these interests in plea acceptance and sentencing 
proceedings, but this is not the same thing as third-party consent and merely begs the 
distributive justice questions of which third-party interests are legitimate and how each 
should be weighed relative to others. Moreover, as many commentators have observed, in 
light of pervasive disparities in bargaining power, information, and cognitive abilities, it is 
far from clear that informed consent fairly characterizes the position of most defendants who 
accept plea deals. See, e.g., Julian A. Cook, III, All Aboard! The Supreme Court, Guilty Pleas, 
and the Railroading of Criminal Defendants, 75 U. CoLO. L. REV. 863, 906-13 (2004) 
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In recent literature, one common approach has been to use trial 
outcomes as a benchmark.121 As Ronald Wright has put it, "[a] 
healthy system would aspire to replicate through its guilty pleas the 
same pattern of outcomes that trials would have produced."122 
While illuminating in some respects, the approach has important 
limitations. 123 For instance, as criminal trials become increasingly 
rare in many jurisdictions, it becomes more difficult to use predicted 
trial outcomes as a benchmark.124 Moreover, the trial distortion 
approach says nothing about what may be the most important and 
difficult distributive justice question in plea bargaining: how large 
of a discount should the defendant receive from the expected trial 
result in return for his or her guilty plea? Finally, the approach 
accepts uncritically the mix of substantive criminal law, procedural 
rules, and judge and juror proclivities that produce trial outcomes, 
even though one of the potential benefits of plea bargaining is the 
possibility of overcoming some of the features of formal doctrine and 
legal processes that tend to produce unsatisfactory results.125 
Yet, theory seems to provide no more satisfactory a framework 
than expected trial results. Basic purposes of punishment are a 
contested matter and not infrequently point in different 
directions. 126 Deontological (more specifically, retributive) 
approaches are said to hold sway at present among academic 
(discussing inequities in plea bargaining process). 
121 See, e.g., Bibas, supra note 5, at 2468 ("Plea-bargaining practices need many reforms 
to conform more closely to the shadows oftrial .... "). 
122 Wright, supra note 3, at 83. 
123 For a more extended discussion of Professor Wright's "trial distortion" theory, see 
generally Michael M. O'Hear, What's Good About Trials?: A Response to Trial Distortion and 
the End oflnnocence in Federal Criminal Justice, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 209 (2007). 
124 See Wright, supra note 3, at 83 n.12 (finding that lack of trials could lead to bargaining 
abuses). 
125 See PAUL H. ROBINSON & MICHAEL T. CAHILL, LAW WITHOUT JUSTICE: WHY CRIMINAL 
LAW DOESN'T GIVE PEOPLE WHAT THEY DESERVE 82 (2006) ("The claim that bargains do not 
resemble the proper formal legal sanctions available is problematic from a desert perspective 
only if the law on the books tracks desert better than the bargains do. Yet in an era of ever-
expanding criminal prohibitions and ever-escalating criminal penalties, there is reason to 
suspect this is not the case."). 
126 See, e.g., Michael M. O'Hear, Sentencing the Green-Collar Offender: Punishment, 
Culpability, and Environmental Crime, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 133, 250-52 (2004) 
(discussing debates over deterrence as appropriate purpose of punishment and identifying 
inconsistencies between deterrence- and culpabill.ty-based approaches in punishment of 
environmental crimes). 
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commentators, 127 but such consensus at a broad level of abstraction 
(even if it really exists and is relevant) masks important areas of 
dissensus as to what retributivism really requires of the criminal 
justice system. 128 
But perhaps there is yet hope that we can bridge the divide 
between retributive and consequentialist approaches. As I have 
argued elsewhere, Paul Robinson and his collaborators have 
developed a promising means of doing so. 129 Indeed, because his 
approach shares the same root concerns with perceived legitimacy 
and law-abidingness that animate Tyler's work, Robinson's theory 
merits some particular attention here. 
Drawing on his own body of social scientific research, Robinson 
argues that crime control ends are most effectively advanced 
through policies that enhance public respect for the criminal justice 
system and that this goal is best achieved by adhering to one 
particular brand of retributive proportionality, that is, the 
calibration of punishment with public views of the relative 
blameworthiness of different types of criminal conduct. 130 
Implementing his approach in a systematic way would require a 
considerable amount of empirical research on public attitudes 
towards different forms of criminality-research whose feasibility 
has been called into question by some commentators.131 According 
to Robinson, however, existing research indicates that "[p]eople can 
and do agree-not always, but usually, and more often than one 
127 See Christopher, supra note 112, at 846-47 (noting that retributivism has been 
endorsed by legislatures, courts, and scholars). 
128 See, e.g., ROBINSON & CAHILL, supra note 125, at 19-20 (noting differences between 
"desert pragmatists" and "desert moralists," and describing controversy over whether 
resulting harm should affect punishment). 
129 O'Hear, supra note 126, at 155-56. 
130 RoBINSON & CAHILL, supra note 125, at 17; Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The 
Utility of Desert, 91 Nw. U. L. REV. 453,457 (1997). For an example of recent empirical work 
lending support to Robinson's theory, see Janice Nadler, Flouting the Law, 83 TEX. L. 
REV. 1399, 1402-03 (2005). 
131 Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises Upon 
Which They Rest, 17 HOFSTRAL. REV. 1, 16 (1988) (noting that members of U.S. Sentencing 
Commission rejected proposal to base sentencing guidelines on public views of desert because 
they "believed that public polling was not sufficiently advanced or detailed to warrant its use 
as accurate sources in ranking criminal behaviors"). 
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might think-about what constitutes deserved punishment in 
specific cases. "132 
Even granting this contention, however, there are important 
limitations on the usefulness of Robinson's approach as a source of 
distributive norms for plea bargaining. For instance, it is unclear 
what should be done with crimes about which public values are 
uncertain, evolving, deeply conflicted, or subject to considerable 
regional variation, which might include such large and important 
components of the criminal docket as drug and gun offenses. Nor is 
it clear, as Robinson himself concedes, how to manage the implicit 
trade-offs in plea bargaining between achieving desert in the case 
at hand and showing lenience so as to secure a guilty plea and 
conserve resources for doing justice in other cases.133 There also are 
conceptual difficulties in translating a ranking of relative crime 
severity-which is where Robinson locates the public consensus on 
which he relies134-into a scale of actual punishment. We all may 
agree that simple robbery should be punished less than armed 
robbery and more than theft from person, but within those 
parameters, what exactly should the prosecutor demand by way of 
a sentence in any given robbery case?135 Finally, what should be 
132 ROBINSON & CAHILL, supra note 125, at 14. 
133 See id. at 84 ("As yet, we have at best incomplete answers to these critical questions."). 
134 See id. at 14 (stating that people assess relative blameworthiness by placing cases in 
rank order). 
135 Robinson would respond to this concern by arguing that additional criteria may be 
developed to distinguish among those who have committed the same crime and that once the 
full range of distinctions among all offenses are mapped on a scale anchored by the minimum 
and maximum possible penalties, there will, in fact, be a discrete, narrow range of 
punishment that will be associated with each degree ofblameworthiness of the defendant's 
conduct. See Paul H. Robinson, The Role of Moral Philosophers in the Competition Between 
De ontological and Empirical Desert, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1831, 1835 (2007) ("[E]mpirical 
desert does not produce an indeterminate range of punishment, as some have suggested, but 
rather a specific amount."). This, however, suggests a scheme of enormous complexity, 
reminiscent of the federal sentencing guidelines, which have been heavily criticized on 
precisely these grounds. See, e.g., Michael M. O'Hear, The Myth of Uniformity, 17 FED. 
SENT'G REP. 249 (2005) (illustrating problems with length and detail in U.S. Sentencing 
Guidelines' attempts at uniformity). Moreover, even to the extent that consensus over 
relative offense severity can be successfully translated into a usable, comprehensive, ordinal 
scale, the consensus may break down over the appropriate anchoring points, which would be 
a function of preferred overall severity. As Robinson has suggested, disagreements over 
general punishment severity mask the ordinal consensus, Robinson, supra, at 1835, and raise 
important conceptual and practical difficulties over how to account for community-to-
community variation in preferred overall severity when evaluating plea deals. 
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done in those cases in which public views of a just outcome diverge 
sharply from those of the defendant, the victim, or both? Robinson 
is deeply concerned with public views of the legitimacy of the 
criminal justice system, but the public simply pays no attention to 
the mine run of cases. Defendants and victims, however, do pay 
attention to even the most routine of cases, so perhaps we ought to 
weigh their views of distributive justice more heavily than those of 
the inattentive public. 136 
This suggests yet another approach to distributive justice: plea 
bargains might be judged according to how well they satisfied the 
expectations of the parties in the case. Empirical research indicates 
that the fairness of outcomes tends to be assessed by reference to 
expectations. 137 What might shape defendant expectations as to the 
plea bargain? Unfortunately, there is no simple, clear answer to 
this question. Repeat offenders surely will look to their own past 
experience as a guide to what a just outcome would be in a new 
case. 138 Additionally, empirical research indicates that defendants' 
assessments of fairness are influenced by whether their outcomes 
compare favorably with those of others convicted of the same 
crime.139 Expectations also may be shaped by conversations with 
defense counsel, promises made by law enforcement officers, earlier 
plea deals struck with codefendants, and so forth. In any given 
case, the defendant may have no clear basis upon which to form an 
expectation or may receive conflicting signals from a variety of 
different sources. 140 Victims likewise may receive conflicting signals 
136 See HEUMANN, supra note 19, at 169 ("I suspect that in most communities a 'zone of 
indifference' surrounds court practices. Within this zone, the community is indifferent to how 
and why cases are plea bargained or tried." (footnotes omitted)). 
137 O'Hear, supra note 5, at 866; see also James H. McGinnis & Kenneth A. Carlson, 
Offenders' Perceptions of Their Sentences, 5 J. OFFENDER COUNSELING, SERVICES & 
REHABILITATION 27, 35 (1981) ("These data [gathered in prison inmate interviews] indicate 
that offenders' perception of their sentences as lenient or severe is a function of the deviation 
of the sentences from their expectations."). 
138 Felony defendants typically do have prior involvement with the criminal justice 
system. See, e.g., Casper et al., supra note 12, at 488 (noting that in sample of 411 felony 
defendants only twelve percent had never been arrested before). 
139 Id. at 486, 494. 
140 In one study of one hundred inmates in an Ontario prison, researchers found that 
forty-two based their sentence expectations on information received from their lawyers, while 
fifty-five looked to their own personal knowledge of the criminal justice system. McGinnis 
& Carlson, supra note 137, at 32-33. Underscoring the difficulty of using offender 
expectations as a measure of distributive justice, the researchers found a remarkably high 
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or no signal at all, and may develop expectations that divN'J.Ifl 
significantly from those of defendants. Indeed, this litH· of' 
distributive justice analysis may bring us back around to part of th•'' 
procedural justice agenda: if prosecutors develop and use objective' 
criteria in a transparent way in their plea bargaining, this not only 
should reassure participants in the criminal justice system that 
prosecutors are neutral and trustworthy (proceduraljustice values), 
but also should help condition participant expectations and better 
ensure that outcomes match expectations (a distributive justice 
value). In the absence of such criteria, however, an expectations-
based view of distributive justice would not supply an especially 
clear means of assessing plea bargaining outcomes. 
Although a comprehensive treatment of distributive justice in 
plea bargaining lies beyond the scope of this Article, I hope that this 
Part at least has conveyed some of the important difficulties. This 
is not to say, however, that the quest for distributive justice is futile. 
We may lack a single, determinate, consensus principle to guide the 
analysis, but in any given case, there likely will be some outcomes 
that seem reasonably consistent with a number of the different 
approaches to distributive justice and other outcomes that seem 
inappropriate from nearly any principled perspective. While it 
generally may be defensible for prosecutors to surrender a solid 
second-degree murder charge in return for a manslaughter plea, I 
suspect it is only very rarely appropriate to make the same deal for 
a plea to simple assault. Still, as is indicated by empirical 
research, 141 there seems to be more than enough play in the 
distributive justice joints for procedural justice to matter to criminal 
litigation participants and thus to warrant greater attention from 
scholars and practitioners of plea bargaining. 
D. COLLATERAL BENEFITS: TRANSPARENCY TO THIRD PARTIES 
Thus far this Article has focused on one set of procedural justice 
benefits, that is, those arising from the enhanced acceptance of plea 
bargaining outcomes and perceptions of legitimacy among 
degree of variance in expected sentences, considerably higher than the variance of actual 
sentences (standard deviation of 21.26 months versus 9.95 months). I d. at 32. 
141 See infra notes 224-30 and accompanying text. 
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defendants. One set of collateral benefits, however, also merits 
consideration: the procedural justice norms I have proposed will 
increase the transparency of the plea bargaining process to 
interested third parties, including victims and the community at 
large. Although actual conversations between prosecutors and 
defense counsel will remain private, the reasoning process 
underlying plea deals will be more open to system outsiders; the 
objective criteria prosecutors employ will be publicly available while 
case-specific explanations of deals and acknowledgements of 
defendants' arguments for lenience will be articulated in court 
during plea acceptance hearings. 
Although victims traditionally have been excluded from the plea 
bargaining process, there is no reason to believe they would respond 
to procedural justice in plea bargaining any differently than 
defendants-that is, by exhibiting increased acceptance of outcomes, 
enhanced perceptions of system legitimacy, and increased 
lawfulness. While perhaps not conventionally conceptualized as 
within the core objectives of the criminal justice system, these 
effects seem not only clearly beneficial in their own right, but also 
consistent with the system's growing attentiveness to victims' 
needs. 142 Of course, offering victims meaningful voice opportunities 
in plea bargaining gives rise to administrative challenges quite 
distinct from those presented by defendant voice.143 For that reason, 
a full consideration of procedural justice for victims in plea 
bargaining lies beyond the scope of this Article. For now, though, it 
seems reasonably clear that victim-centered procedural norms 
would dovetail in some important respects with the defendant-
centered norms proposed here. More specifically, using objective 
142 See Douglas E. Beloof, Judicial Leadership at Sentencing Under the Crime Victims' 
Rights Act: Judge Kozinski in Kenna and Judge Cassell in Degenhardt, 19 FED. SENT'G 
REP. 36, 37 (2006) (describing recent legislative successes of victims' rights movement and 
arguing that victims' participatory rights in criminal justice system are now well-established); 
Michael M. O'Hear, Victims and Criminal Justice: What's Next?, 19 FED. SENT'G 
REP. 83, 86--87 (2006) (noting proposal of victims' rights advocate to expand victim 
participation in plea bargaining and arguing that victims' rights agenda represents implicit 
rejection of narrowly focused deterrence and retribution agenda in favor of new "harm-
reduction" paradigm of criminal justice). 
143 For a recent discussion of these problems, see generally Simon N. Verdun-Jones & 
Adamira A Tijerina, Four Models of Victim Involvement During Plea Negotiations: Bridging 
the Gap Between Legal Reforms and Current Legal Practice, 46 CANADIAN J. CRIMINOLOGY & 
CRIM. JUST. 471 (2004). 
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criteria and providing explanations of plea deals would help assure 
victims, just as much as defendants, of the neutrality and 
trustworthiness of prosecutors.144 
Such transparency also might contribute to greater perceived 
legitimacy in the eyes of the public. Although problems with the 
accuracy and proportionality of outcomes have dominated recent 
scholarly literature on plea bargaining, 145 transparency and 
accountability to the public have also figured prominently in the 
discussion. 146 Public opinion surveys consistently find low approval 
rates of plea bargaining.147 Leading commentators have argued that 
plea bargaining causes the public to lose confidence in the criminal 
justice system, 148 and that public distrust of plea bargaining has 
been manipulated by politicians to gain support for dubious criminal 
justice reforms. 149 While it remains difficult to isolate the public's 
principal objection to plea bargaining, there are good reasons to 
believe that the secretiveness of the practice greatly contributes to 
the negative perceptions. 150 Measures that enhance the 
144 The limited empirical research on victims and plea bargaining does provide some 
support for the hypothesis that greater transparency enhances victim satisfaction. See 
McCOY, supra note 18, at 204 n.5 (reporting study showing "some increase ... in victim 
satisfaction with the court process" when "allowed to be present at plea bargaining sessions"). 
For a more detailed discussion of victims and plea bargaining, see generally O'Hear, supra 
note 75. 
145 See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
146 See, e.g., Stephanos Bibas, Transparency and Participation in Criminal Procedure, 81 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 911, 913-16 (2006) (identifying gulf between "insiders" and "outsiders" in 
criminal justice system); Sergio Herzog, Plea Bargaining Practices: Less Covert, More Public 
Support?, 50 CRIME &DELINQUENCE 590, 590-92 (2004) (discussing public's negative attitude 
with respect to plea bargaining); Wright & Miller, supra note 15, at 33-34 (discussing public's 
loss offaith in plea bargaining system). As suggested above, my view is that some scholars 
may overemphasize the significance of the perceptions of a largely inattentive public relative 
to those of defendants and victims. See supra note 136 and accompanying text. This is not 
to say, however, that public perceptions ought to be regarded as wholly irrelevant to plea 
bargaining reform. 
147 See McCOY, supra note 18, at 64-65 (discussing two studies that "point toward 
some general concerns underlying public dissatisfaction with the guilty plea process"); 
Herzog, supra note 146, at 590-91 (noting three studies in which large majority of 
respondents (80%, 82%, and 64%) did not support plea bargaining). 
148 See Wright & Miller, supra note 15, at 33 ("The public in general, and victims in 
particular, lose faith in a system where the primary goal is processing and the secondary goal 
is justice."). 
149 See McCOY, supra note 18, at 33-36 (discussing political context of plea bargaining). 
150 See id. at 67 ("[T]he fact that the sentencing decisions are made behind closed doors 
creates its own unfortunate impression."); Herzog, supra note 146, at 591 (noting arguments 
that convertness and secretiveness of plea bargaining reduces public confidence). 
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transparency of plea bargaining therefore may contribute to the 
criminal justice system's perceived legitimacy/51 or, at the very 
least, better inform misguided public debate over the practice. 152 
IV. RESPONDING TO OBJECTIONS 
Objections to the proposed procedural justice norms in plea 
bargaining will likely fall into two categories: (1) implementing the 
norms would have adverse effects on the operation of the criminal 
justice system and (2) procedural justice in plea bargaining is not 
capable of delivering the benefits suggested by the social psychology 
model. These objections are detailed below along with responses to 
each major concern. Although some of the objections do raise 
important, unanswered questions as to implementation of the 
procedural justice norms, they are not nearly so compelling on their 
face to justify a definitive conclusion that the costs of procedural 
justice in plea bargaining outweigh the benefits.153 
A. OBJECTIONS BASED ON ADVERSE EFFECTS 
1. The Transaction Costs of Procedural Justice Will Undermine 
Efforts to Achieve Distributively Just Outcomes. Incremental 
procedure entails incremental transaction costs. Assuming criminal 
justice budgets remain constant, the pursuit ofproceduraljustice in 
plea bargaining may leave fewer resources available for other 
purposes, thus potentially affecting the ability of the criminal justice 
system to achieve distributively just outcomes (even taking into 
account the modesty with which distributive justice claims should 
151 Lending some modest support to this hypothesis, a recent study of Israeli attitudes 
toward plea bargaining found that greater openness regarding the purposes of plea 
bargaining was capable of increasing public support for the practice, albeit not by a large 
margin. Herzog, supra note 146, at 606. 
152 For a recent, more detailed account of the costs of opacity in the criminal justice 
system, see Bibas, supra note 146, at 945-52. 
153 I operate here in utilitarian, cost-benefit balancing mode. As suggested above, 
however, it is possible to conceptualize procedural justice in plea bargaining as a moral 
mandate. See supra note 115 and accompanying text. I leave a more complete elaboration 
of this theory for another day, but note for now that there is at least a plausible basis for 
implementing some elements of procedural justice in plea bargaining even in the absence of 
a persuasive cost-benefit showing. 
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be advanced). For instance, as resources of prosecutors aro 
stretched, they may simply choose not to pursue as many cases or 
may offer ever more generous plea bargains so as to further reduce 
the number of resource-intensive trials. Alternatively, prosecutors 
may shift resources to cases that are easy to prosecute (e.g., drug 
and gun possession, routine street crime) and away from cases that 
are more complex though perhaps no less important (e.g., 
sophisticated financial fraud, environmental crime, transnational 
drug trafficking). Or prosecutors may attempt to enhance their plea 
bargaining leverage by lobbying for legislative reforms that would 
increase sentences or broaden the scope of criminal liability.154 
These, and any number of other conceivable prosecutorial responses, 
threaten to skew patterns of charging, plea bargaining, and 
sentencing in ways that may undercut the ability of the criminal 
justice system to deliver criminal punishment in ways proportionate 
to the severity of the offense, consistent across similar cases, and 
otherwise responsive to public priorities. 
Carried to an extreme-say, offering defendants and other 
interested parties unlimited opportunities to speak in court and 
requiring a written, point-by-point response to all factual and legal 
contentions-procedural justice surely would conflict in substantial 
and troubling ways with other important objectives. This does not 
mean, however, that a more modest yet still meaningful procedural 
justice agenda raises similar concerns. The following parts consider 
in turn each of the proposed procedural justice norms. 
a. Voice. Prosecutors should seek to ensure that defendants 
have a meaningful opportunity to convey their side of the story 
before making a plea offer .155 Implementing this proposal, however, 
would not be without its difficulties. For instance, while defense 
lawyers might seem the most appropriate vehicle for defendant 
voice, case volumes and economic constraints often leave defense 
154 See William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. 
REV. 505, 537-38 (2001) (discussing lobbying efforts of prosecutors). To note that prosecutors 
may seek legislation is not to say they will necessarily get it. As Darryl Brown has shown 
through recent empirical research, "legislatures routinely decline proposals for new crimes 
or greater punishments." Darryl K. Brown, Democracy and Decriminalization, WASH. & LEE 
LEGAL STUDIES PAPER No. 2006--07, at 4 (Sept. 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract= 
932667. 
155 See supra note 66 and accompanying text. 
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counsel with no more than a few minutes to interact with many of 
their clients before court appearances156-nowhere near enough time 
to establish a relationship of trust with the client/57 obtain a 
complete version of the client's side of the story, explore potential 
defenses, and discuss plea bargaining objectives and tactics. In 
some jurisdictions, then, public defense budgets may require 
significant increases if lawyers are to provide meaningful voice 
opportunities for their clients without substantially slowing down 
the processing of cases. 
As a lower-cost alternative, prosecutors might work with police 
to develop processes to provide voice before formal charging. 158 One 
possibility would be for police to offer all defendants an opportunity 
to provide a post-arrest written statement that would be appended 
to the official police report and included in the prosecutor's case 
file. 159 An important difficulty is that so many defendants suffer 
from impediments to effective written communication: low levels of 
education, 160 poor cognitive functioning, 161 lack of fluency in 
English, 162 and so forth. Paraprofessionals could be made available 
to provide assistance, but this might significantly increase 
transaction costs in high-volume jurisdictions. Alternatively, 
prosecutors might screen written statements to identify those 
156 See supra notes 25, 70 and accompanying text. 
157 See BOGIRA, supra note 25, at 125-26 (noting distrust defendants tend to feel regarding 
public defenders); LOWENTHAL, supra note 75, at 93 (noting gender, ethnicity, and other 
barriers between public defender and client). 
158 This is not to say that police necessarily will conform to unilateral prosecutorial 
directives. Police and prosecutors have a complicated, interdependent relationship. See, e.g., 
Daniel Richman, Prosecutors and Their Agents, Agents and Their Prosecutors, 103 COLUM. 
L. REV. 749, 758-94 (2003) (describing prosecutor-agent relationships in federal system). 
Still, prosecutors typically do have some sway with police in light of their formal role as 
gatekeepers to the courthouse, id. at 758-67, and, in any event, police should be as interested 
as prosecutors in procedural justice reforms that are capable of increasing acceptance of 
criminal punishment and decreasing recidivism rates. 
159 Decisions would have to be made, and clearly communicated to defendants, as to 
whether and how such statements could be used against them in legal proceedings. See supra 
note 69 and accompanying text. 
160 See Thomas C. O'Bryant, The Great Unobtainable Writ: Indigent Pro Se Litigation 
After the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 41 H.ARV. C.R.-C.L. L. 
REV. 299, 309-10 (2006) (noting lack of education among prisoners). 
161 Id. 
162 See Christopher E. Smith, The Malleability of Constitutional Doctrine and Its Ironic 
Impact on Prisoners' Rights, 11 B.D. PUB. fNT. L.J. 73, 89 (2001) (noting that many prisoners 
often are not fluent in English). 
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requiring additional follow-up by defense counsel in light of obvious 
problems with written communication. 
Experimentation and empirical research will doubtlessly suggest 
additional voice alternatives. It is not clear what the most cost-
effective approach will prove to be. Indeed, the answer will probably 
vary by jurisdiction, depending on such factors as the size and 
composition of the criminal case docket, police-prosecutor relations, 
and the structure and location of pretrial detention facilities. Yet, 
there does seem to be some promising avenues for ensuring at least 
minimal levels of voice without incurring overwhelming costs. 
b. Objective Criteria, Explanation, and Principled 
Engagement. Prosecutors can reassure defendants of their 
neutrality and trustworthiness by employing objective criteria in 
making plea bargaining decisions, explaining their decisions, and 
demonstrating consideration of defense arguments in favor of 
lenience (even if such arguments are ultimately rejected). Such 
measures would potentially give rise to at least three types of cost: 
prosecutor time, outcome rigidity, and reduced deterrence. 
Time costs need not be great. Objective criteria can be developed 
on an office-wide basis. The rapidity with which plea bargains are 
routinely struck in high-volume jurisdictions163 suggests that 
relatively few variables are regarded as significant in most cases, 164 
and that those variables already are well understood by experienced 
practitioners. 165 Reducing those variables and their weight to 
written form as general plea bargaining guidelines should not be 
163 See Abbe Smith, Too Much Heart and Not Enough Heat: The Short Life and Fractured · 
Ego of the Emphatic, Heroic Public Defender, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1203, 1256 (2004) (noting 
that public defenders often only meet clients and arrange guilty pleas). 
164 This is consistent with psychological research on decisionmaking. SeeR. Barry Ruback 
& Jonathan Wroblewski, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Psychological and Policy 
Reasons for Simplification, 7 PSYCHOL. PuB. POL 'y & L. 739, 756 (2001) ("Rather than being 
complexly determined, most decisions can be explained by only two or three factors, because 
oflimitations in how much information individuals can remember and process."). 
165 See FEELEY, supra note 19, at 187-88 (comparing plea bargaining to supermarket in 
which "customers may complain about prices, but rarely 'bargain' to get them reduced"). 
Lending support to this hypothesis of a clear going rate based on a small number of variables, 
a recent study conducted in one urban courthouse found that the lawyers surveyed were able 
to correctly predict the final outcome of most cases upon being told only the crime of 
conviction, the defendant's criminal history, and the identity of the lawyers in the case. 
Hephner, supra note 19, at 44-45, 55; see also HEUMANN, supra note 19, at 103 (describing 
five factors that "weigh heavily" in classification of cases as serious or non-serious by 
prosecutors). 
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unduly burdensome. 166 Nor should it be especially time-consuming 
to provide case-specific explanations based on those variables or 
acknowledge defendants' arguments.167 
Rigidity concerns are more troubling. The use of objective 
criteria inevitably will produce plea bargaining rules that are both 
over- and under-inclusive, since no set of objective criteria can hope 
to capture the full range of considerations that seem morally 
relevant in all cases. Gary Lowenthal supplies a nice illustration 
from his experience as a prosecutor in Maricopa County, Arizona, 
where the County Attorney's "deadly weapon" policy required 
prosecutors to seek a lengthy prison term in any case in which a gun 
had been discharged: 
In a case prosecuted by one of my colleagues . . . a 
middle-aged man with steady employment, an intact 
family and no prior criminal record had fired a gun over 
the heads of his two teen-age sons to "get their 
attention" when they were fighting in front of their 
home. Although no one was hurt and the two sons were 
horrified that their father was being prosecuted, the 
most lenient plea bargain my colleague could offer 
required the father to serve at least five years in prison. 
This made no sense to me. The man had certainly 
exercised poor judgment ... but his conduct also 
reflected an otherwise law-abiding parent's frustrated 
response to an emotionally charged situation. Although 
he may have committed the same crime as a gang leader 
shooting a gun in the direction of members of a rival 
gang, their punishments should not have been 
determined in a one-size-fits-all fashion. 168 
166 Indeed, it is not uncommon for prosecutorial offices to do so already, although often in 
a less systematic, transparent fashion than would be ideal. See, e.g., HEILBRONER, supra 
note 32, at 41 (noting policy of Manhattan prosecutor's office that sentences should increase 
with each arrest); LOWENTHAL, supra note 75, at 39 (describing Maricopa County deadly 
weapons policy). 
167 Explanation and acknowledgment may be delivered to defense counsel and in open 
court. See supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text. 
168 LOWENTHAL, supra note 75, at 40. 
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Lowenthal's example shows how the use of objective criteria-like 
whether a gun was discharged--can produce outcomes that are 
difficult to justify from any distributive justice standpoint. 169 
Indeed, a rigid adherence to harsh, over-inclusive plea bargaining 
rules seems hard to square with the procedural justice goal of 
perceived trustworthiness, that is, the perception that the 
authorities care about defendants' welfare and want to treat them 
fairly. 170 
The rigidity problem exposes a point of tension within procedural 
justice theory that has not been adequately addressed in social 
psychology literature. 171 However, this problem has been dealt with 
extensively in the abundant scholarly literature on sentencing 
guidelines. 172 The preferred approach in the sentencing context is 
that objective criteria set presumptive sentences or sentencing 
ranges, with some measure of equitable discretion preserved to 
override presumptive outcomes in unusual cases. 173 The 
presumptive approach seems readily adaptable to plea bargaining 
guidelines and may provide a good model for addressing tensions 
between neutrality and trustworthiness. 174 
169 See also HEILBRONER, supra note 32, at 42 (describing one case in which application 
of prosecutorial policy of seeking increased sentence for each arrest would have resulted in 
two-month jail term for failing to pay one-dollar subway fare, prompting judge to give tongue-
lashing to prosecutor). 
170 See Tyler, supra note 38, at 441 ("[P]eople value evidence that the authorities with 
whom they are dealing are concerned about their welfare and want to treat them fairly."). 
171 Mashaw has succinctly characterized the dilemma in connection with his "dignitary" 
procedure value of rationality: 
A concern for rationality ... leads to concerns about inconsistency and 
arbitrariness. Yet the routines that make consistency possible in 
bureaucracies are among our prime examples of irrational behavior-the 
wooden inability to respond to differences in context. We thus seem to 
confront a choice between the irrationality ofbureaucratic control and the 
irrationality of official discretion. 
MAsHAW, supra note 115, at 203. 
172 See, e.g., R.A. Duff, Guidance and Guidelines, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1162, 1164-81 (2005) 
(concluding that rigid numerical sentencing guidelines are too constraining); K.yron Huigens, 
Solving the Williams Puzzle, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1048, 1068-79 (2005) (discussing advantages 
of discretionary sentencing schemes over determinable sentencing schemes). 
173 See Kevin R. Reitz, The New Sentencing Conundrum: Policy and Constitutional Law 
at Cross-Purposes, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1082, 1102-04 (2005) (discussing presumptive 
sentences with potential departures from norm). 
174 Ronald Wright, who also argues for prosecutorial guidelines structured in this way, 
observes that New Jersey's guidelines already reflect this approach. Wright, supra note 87, 
at 1103. 
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The use of objective criteria in plea bargaining also may give rise 
to concerns that deterrence will be compromised. Imagine, for 
instance, that a prosecutor's office adopted a (not unreasonable) 
policy of recommending straight probation in return for a guilty plea 
in cases involving first-time possession of a personal-use quantity of 
marijuana. An express policy to this effect might be interpreted as 
a free pass for marijuana users and thereby undercut deterrence for 
those who have not yet been convicted for the first time. On the 
other hand, given the low risks of apprehension for many common 
types of crime and the tendency towards over-optimism among 
offenders, there are good reasons to doubt the strength of deterrence 
effects even in the absence of such plea bargaining rules. 175 
Moreover, repeat offenders, as well as those defendants who have 
had family members and friends suffer prosecution, already are 
likely to have a pretty good idea of what sorts of plea deals are 
available for which types of defendants; they do not need written 
rules to know where the safe harbors are. For other offenders, 
particularly those with high social status, the risks of arrest and 
conviction alone, regardless of sentence, will be an effective 
deterrent. 176 Finally, to the extent that plea bargaining rules do, in 
fact, diminish deterrence in some respects, there will be 
countervailing deterrence benefits, as the rules (such as Maricopa 
County's "deadly weapon policy")177 will highlight those particularly 
dangerous or undesirable forms of conduct that prosecutors most 
wish to deter. 178 
175 For a more detailed discussion of reasons to be skeptical of deterrence, see Paul H. 
Robinson & John M. Darley, The Role of Deterrence in the Formulation of Criminal Law 
Rules: At Its Worst When Doing Its Best, 91 GEO. L.J. 949, 953-56 (2003). 
176 See Carolyn N. Ko, Note, Civil Restraining Orders for Domestic Violence: The 
Unresolved Question of"Efficacy," 11 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 361, 388 (2002) (noting social 
status has effect on likelihood that arrest will have deterrent effect). 
177 See LOWENTHAL, supra note 75 (describing policy). 
178 To the extent one believes that criminal punishment in America is already too harsh, 
one might fear another cost of transparency: once the public understands the magnitude of 
the guilty plea discount given to some offenders, the public will demand even longer 
sentences. As Stephanos Bibas recently observed, however, the harshness of public attitudes 
likely to a considerable extent is caused by opacity, and transparency actually may help 
alleviate the problem. Bibas, supra note 146, at 958. Moreover, as noted above, public 
attitudes never have been as uniformly punitive as is sometimes believed, and now may be 
shifting in a more constructive direction. See supra notes 107-11 and accompanying text. 
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c. Avoidance of High-Pressure Tactics. Because it is conned.ed 
to the perception that authorities take legal rights seriously, res pod. 
seems incompatible with the use of high-pressure tactics by 
prosecutors to extract quick guilty pleas, such as the use of threats 
of increased charges or exploding offers that expire before 
defendants have an opportunity to confer adequately with their 
lawyers. 179 Prohibiting such practices, however, might make it at 
least marginally more difficult for prosecutors to consummate quick 
plea agreements, potentially leading to higher trial rates and 
concomitant burdens on an overtaxed criminal justice system.180 
Elsewhere, I have explored at length the potential consequences 
of a ban on charging threats. 181 In brief, while it is impossible to 
predict the effects of regulating pressure tactics with precision, trial 
rates likely would rise slightly, but probably not dramatically. The 
rate of increase would be constrained by: (a) the manifest 
advantages to most defendants of pleading guilty/82 and (b) the 
potential for prosecutors to maintain their plea negotiation leverage 
by increasing initial charges, lobbying the legislature for harsher 
sentencing statutes and other self-serving new laws, or both.183 To 
be sure, these potential prosecutorial responses may be troubling 
and costly in their own right. On the other hand, there also are apt 
to be ancillary benefits, such as improved case screening by 
prosecutors, before charges are filed. 184 
Moreover, to whatever extent plea bargaining reforms do increase 
trial rates, we should bear in mind that trials do not necessarily 
represent a net loss. A trial may result in the acquittal of an 
179 See supra notes 82-85 and accompanying text. 
180 On the other hand, psychology research has documented the potential for negotiations 
to break down if one side is perceived to be acting unfairly. See, e.g., Christine Jolls et al., A 
Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1494 (1998) (citing 
Matthew Rabin, Incorporating Fairness Into Game Theory and Economics, 83 AM. ECON. 
REV. 1281 (1993)) (indicating people are willing to sacrifice their own wellbeing for those who 
act fairly and to punish those who act unfairly); see also O'Hear, supra note 5, at 866, 893 
(applying these studies to plea bargaining). It is conceivable, then, that prosecutorial 
pressure tactics sometimes misfire and that reducing the use of such tactics accordingly may 
have little net effect on trial rates. 
181 See id. at 891-901 (describing six possible options prosecutors might take in absence 
of charging threats). 
182 See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text. 
183 See O'Hear, supra note 5, at 892 (describing possible responses to absence of charging 
threats, including increasing initial charges). 
184 See id. at 894 (noting early review of merits of case would be welcome development). 
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innocent defendant who otherwise would have buckled under 
prosecutorial pressure and pled guilty. A trial may provide an 
opportunity for a jury, representing the voice of the community, to 
signal disapproval of otherwise opaque prosecutorial charging 
practices. A trial provides potentially valuable voice opportunities 
for victims and defendants185 and may result in useful sanctioning 
of police misconduct, as by the suppression of evidence gathered in 
violation of the Fourth Amendment. More generally, a trial offers 
far more information than a plea hearing to interested parties and 
the public about alleged criminal conduct, the human consequence 
of crime, and the activities of police and prosecutors. 
d. Complementarity of Procedural and Distributive Justice. 
Although the costs do not seem unmanageable, some jurisdictions 
will doubtlessly find it challenging to implement the procedural 
justice norms. Slower case processing and the expectation of 
increased effort by prosecutors, even if small on a per case basis, 
may add up such that it becomes more difficult to achieve important 
distributive justice goals, such as prosecuting and obtaining a 
conviction in all cases involving serious social harm referred to 
prosecutors by the police. To recognize the possibility of tradeoffs 
between procedural and distributive justice, however, is not to 
concede that procedural justice and the important benefits it offers 
from the standpoint of acceptance, legitimacy, compliance, 
transparency, and law-abidingness must give way. Moreover, it is 
important to recognize that procedural and distributive justice, 
while in tension in some respects, may in other respects actually 
complement one another. 
Consider, for instance, how voice may contribute to distributive 
goals. Timely information from the defendant may prevent a 
wrongful conviction or otherwise help the prosecutor reach a better 
judgment about an appropriate resolution for the case. As Alafair 
Burke recently has observed, psychology research indicates that 
prosecutors are apt to develop anti-defendant cognitive biases once 
a decision to charge is made.186 Other commentators have observed 
185 It is easy, however, to overestimate the voice qualities of real-world criminal trials. 
See infra notes 237-40 and accompanying text. 
186 See Alafair S. Burke, Improving Prosecutorial Decision Making: Some Lessons of 
Cognitive Science, 47 WM. &MARYL. REV. 1587, 1614 (2006) ("In the context ofprosecutorial 
decision making, the biasing theory is the prosecutor's belief that the defendant is guilty. 
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how prosecutors, given their position in the law enforcement system, 
tend to develop strongly negative attitudes towards defendants as 
a class. 187 Providing meaningful voice opportunities early in the 
process may help the prosecutor to avoid biases, overcome 
stereotypes, and better appreciate the strength of any legal and 
factual defenses that are available, as well as any equitable 
considerations that might appropriately influence resolution of the 
case. 188 These positive effects of voice only would be strengthened 
by the further requirements that prosecutors actually consider what 
defendants say and then explain their decisions. 
Other aspects of procedural justice also are capable of delivering 
distributive justice benefits. Part III.c explained how the use of 
objective criteria would advance the distributive goal of more 
consistently satisfying defendant and victim expectations.189 
Meanwhile, the avoidance of high-pressure tactics may help 
diminish the risk that innocent defendants will feel coerced into 
pleading guilty.190 
In sum, it is far from clear that the proposed procedural justice 
norms would result in an overall loss on the distributive justice side 
of the ledger, let alone that the distributive justice costs would 
outweigh the procedural justice benefits. 
2. The Process Is the Punishment: Bringing Procedural Justice 
to Plea Bargaining Undermines the Invisible Punishment on Which 
the System Relies. The absence ofproceduraljustice marks criminal 
defendants as devalued and undeserving of the community's full 
regard. Yet it might be objected this is precisely as it should be: the 
Once that belief is formed, confirmation bias causes her to seek information that confirms the 
theory of guilt .... "). 
187 See, e.g., LOWENTHAL, supra note 75, at 111 ("Prosecutors are at the center of a culture 
that abhors defendants and those around them. Every day, they interact with police officers 
who see themselves to be at war with criminals .... Crime victims, another important 
constituency, often have wrenching personal stories and cannot fathom why the courts allow 
their tormenters to get off lightly. Exposed to these views, prosecutors often develop a black 
and white view of the world."). 
188 In addition to the value of the information produced by the defendant, any delays for 
procedural justice purposes also may serve the cause of accuracy by giving more time for 
useful information to become available from other sources. See McCOY, supra note 18, at 160 
(noting common attorney view "that the chances of mistake in assessing case facts are greater 
the younger the case"). 
189 See supra notes 137-41 and accompanying text. 
190 See O'Hear, supra note 5, at 899-900 (noting advantages to defendants spared from 
charging threats). 
456 GEORGIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42:407 
whole point of punishment is to degrade the defendant, creating 
deterrent effects, or, if you prefer the retributive viewpoint, 
correcting the moral imbalance created by the defendant's 
degradation of his victim. As Malcolm Feeley famously observed 
nearly three decades ago, the process of criminal prosecution may 
itself be viewed as part of the punishment-indeed, in many low-
level cases, the process may be the only meaningful punishment 
experienced by the offender. 191 Bringing greater procedural justice 
to plea bargaining would give defendants something they do not 
deserve, thereby diluting society's message of condemnation.192 
The argument is rather unattractive, at least insofar as it 
condones "punishment" prior to a determination of guilt through 
formal legal processes. Of course, most defendants who engage in 
plea bargaining do end up pleading guilty, and most of those who 
plead guilty likely are guilty. But no one claims the system is 
foolproof. Indeed, as suggested earlier, an absence of procedural 
justice in plea bargaining actually may enhance the risk of wrongful 
191 See FEELEY, supra note 19, at 30-31 ("In essence, the process itself is the punishment. 
The time, effort, money, and opportunities lost as a direct result of being caught up in the 
system can quickly come to outweigh the penalty that issues from adjudication and 
sentence."). 
192 The argument addressed here is that, by diminishing the dignitary harms inflicted 
during criminal case processing, enhanced procedural justice might inappropriately lessen the 
process-based punishment received by some offenders. The converse, however, also might be 
argued; that is, one might object that enhanced procedural justice inappropriately would 
increase process-based punishment. This objection would focus particularly on a discrete 
class of defendants: those who have been accused oflow-level crimes unlikely to result in a 
sentence of incarceration but who nonetheless are unable to make bail. Their punishment 
is, in effect, the amount of time they must wait in jail for resolution of their cases. To the 
extent that procedural justice results in slower case-processing, these defendants will 
experience a de facto increase in punishment unrelated to the actual severity oftheir crimes. 
Even more troubling, as Josh Bowers has argued, an important subset of these 
defendants-recidivists charged with petty crimes-includes those who are most likely to be 
wrongly accused. See Josh Bowers, Punishing the Innocent, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2008) (manuscript at 8, on file with author), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/ 
sol3/papers. cfm?abstract_id=983819 ("[R]ecidivists are overrepresented among innocent 
defendants and probably comprise the majority ofthe population because institutional biases 
select for their arrest, prosecution, and trial conviction."). It seems particularly unjustifiable 
to increase the process-based punishment of those who are innocent but plead guilty anyway 
to avoid an extended period of pretrial detention. These concerns supply another reason to 
minimize the transaction costs of procedural justice, see supra Part IV.A.l, and may warrant 
some relaxation of procedural justice norms for petty crimes. To the extent that procedural 
justice nonetheless materially delays the consummation of deals in petty cases, defendants 
who cannot make bail at least should be afforded an opportunity to enter an open guilty plea 
as expeditiously as possible. 
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conviction.193 Thus, the assumption that most defendants are guilty 
anyway hardly seems a satisfactory justification for unnecessarily 
rough treatment before guilt is formally established. 
Moreover, when the process itself is conceptualized as a sanction, 
punishment acquires an ad hoc, opaque character. "Process 
punishment" may be administered in diverse ways by a variety of 
actors, not only the prosecutor during plea bargaining, but also (by 
the same reasoning) the arresting police officer, jailers, the judge 
who sets bail, and so forth. Who can keep track of all the rough 
treatment that is dished out prior to conviction and sentencing and 
ensure some degree of overall proportionality between the offense 
and the punishment? Although it may be too much to expect that 
the norms of procedural justice will be rigorously observed by all 
actors throughout the criminal process, a due regard for 
proportionality, accountability, and the rule oflaw counsels against 
legitimizing rough treatment prior to conviction as a valid form of 
"punishment."194 Indeed, doing so would seem inconsistent with the 
emphasis on transparency and uniformity that has dominated the 
punishment policy agenda since the 1970s. 195 
3. Procedural Justice May Result in Less Favorable Deals for 
Defendants. It is a familiar complaint about procedural rights that 
recognizing such rights may actually work to the substantive 
detriment of those whom the rights are nominally supposed to 
protect. 196 Similarly, we might hypothesize that enhanced 
procedural justice in plea bargaining may result in less favorable 
deals for defendants. After all, a reduction in procedural burdens 
may be precisely what the prosecutor is bargaining for-the more 
effort the prosecutor must invest in plea bargaining, the lower the 
transaction costs avoided by entering into the deal. The prosecutor, 
193 See supra note 186 and accompanying text. 
194 See James Q. Whitman, Making Happy Punishers, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2698, 2716-17 
(2005) (book review) (discussing dangers of retributive punishment degenerating into 
"animalistic" vengeance). 
195 See Michael M. O'Hear, Localization and Transparency in Sentencing: Reflections on 
the New Early Disposition Departure, 27 HAMLINE L. REV. 357, 366--69 (2004) (noting 
importance of uniformity and transparency in sentencing guidelines). 
196 See, e.g., MAsHAW, supra note 115, at 33-35 (discussing how welfare recipients may 
have been harmed by enhanced constitutional due process rights surrounding termination 
of benefits). 
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presumably, will then demand greater concessions from the 
defendant in the plea offer. 
Framed this way, though, the argument misses the point of the 
procedural justice effect: Outcomes are not the only things that 
matter to defendants; fair treatment along the way may count just 
as much or even more. The argument will have to be revised in one 
of two ways. First, even taking into account the moderating effects 
of procedural justice, defendants may still be left in an overall worse 
position as a result ofless generous plea offers. Second, procedural 
justice effects may be discounted entirely as a form of false 
consciousness that induces defendants to accept otherwise 
unacceptable outcomes. 197 
Both lines of attack, however, depend on the dubious assumption 
that, due to increased transaction costs, procedural justice reforms 
will result in less favorable deals for defendants. As indicated 
above, however, procedural justice in plea bargaining need not be 
especially costly.198 Moreover, what costs there are need not 
necessarily undermine prosecutors' motives to deal; indeed, it seems 
about as likely that prosecutors would become more generous. As 
William Stuntz has observed, prosecutors are not like private 
litigants seeking to maximize financial gain, but rather pursue a 
much more complicated and uncertain set of objectives.199 Many, for 
instance, will be concerned primarily with volume of cases 
processed. Given such a motive, higher per case transaction costs 
should make prosecutors more, not less, averse to going to trial and 
hence more willing to make plea bargaining concessions in order to 
prevent a net reduction in case volume. Similarly, those motivated 
by high conviction rates may also grow more trial-averse;200 to the 
extent that plea bargaining becomes more costly, prosecutors will 
have fewer resources available for effective trial preparation and 
may have a greater desire to avoid the heightened risks of failure 
197 See supra note 49 and accompanying text. 
198 See supra notes 158--67 and accompanying text. 
199 Stuntz, supra note 19, at 2554. 
200 See Bibas, supra note 5, at 24 71 ("[P]rosecutors want to ensure convictions. They may 
further their careers by racking up good win-loss records, in which every plea bargain counts 
as a win but trials risk being losses. The statistic of conviction, in other words, matters much 
more than the sentence." (footnotes omitted)). 
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presented by trial. 201 Other prosecutors will be motivated primarily 
by a desire to achieve what they believe to be distributively just 
outcomes in all of their cases; increased transaction costs may not 
affect their plea bargaining positions at all. Indeed, as suggested 
above, procedural justice may lead to more generous plea bargaining 
by humanizing defendants in prosecutors' eyes and thereby 
changing prosecutors' views of distributive justice in favorable 
ways.2o2 
In short, while individual results may vary, there are good 
reasons to doubt that defendants' circumstances would be 
systematically worsened by procedural justice. 
B. OBJECTIONS BASED ON DOUBTS ABOUT THE BENEFITS OF 
PROCEDURAL JUSTICE IN PLEA BARGAINING 
1. The Judge Provides the Procedural Justice. In a formal sense, 
the prosecutor's plea bargaining offer, even if accepted, does not 
conclusively resolve a criminal case. 203 Rather, the judge must still 
perform two distinct functions: accept the plea and impose a 
sentence. 204 In so doing, the judge will, to a greater or lesser extent, 
formally adhere to basic norms ofproceduraljustice.205 Defendants, 
201 To be sure, prosecutors seeking to maintain case volume and conviction rates, in lieu 
of sweetening the plea bargaining pot, might lobby the legislature for harsher sentencing laws 
or other reforms that would enhance their bargaining leverage. Such lobbying efforts might 
or might not be successful. See Brown, supra note 154, at 3 (noting that most legislatures 
decline to expand criminal laws). Even if successful, increased leverage might merely restore 
the status quo ante without necessarily resulting in worse outcomes for defendants. 
202 See supra note 188 and accompanying text. To be sure, some defendants will use voice 
opportunities to advance non-credible assertions of innocence or to otherwise deny 
responsibility in ways that reinforce, rather than undermine, the anti-defendant biases of 
prosecutors. Assuming that such biases are pervasive and powerful, however, voice is 
unlikely to do much harm and may do some good. Moreover, competent defense lawyers may 
increase the likelihood of good outcomes by counseling their clients not to waste voice 
opportunities on patently false denials of responsibility. 
203 See generally Richard Neumeg, Annotation, What Constitutes "Rejection" of Plea 
Agreement Under Rule ll(e)(4) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Allowing 
Withdrawal of Plea !{Court Rejects Agreement, 60 A.L.R. FED. 621 (1982) (discussing range 
of potential scenarios following offer and acceptance). 
204 See FED. R. CRIM. P. ll(c)(3) (providing for judicial discretion in accepting plea 
bargain); id. ll(b)(1)(M) (giving judicial discretion in sentencing). 
205 See, e.g., Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 ( 1971) (" [T]he adjudicative element 
inherent in accepting a plea of guilty, must be attended by safeguards to insure the defendant 
what is reasonably due in the circumstances."). 
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for instance, will be given an opportunity to speak in open court in 
connection with both the plea and the sentence. 206 Various objective 
criteria will govern acceptance of the plea and sometimes 
determination of the sentence. 207 Credible arguments for lenience 
will typically be addressed in the sentencing decision.208 The judge 
will expressly acknowledge the legal rights that the defendant 
waives bypleadingguilty.209 Finally, in many courtrooms, there are 
deeply entrenched norms of decorum and courtesy. 210 Perhaps all of 
this judicial procedural justice obviates the need for prosecutorial 
procedural justice. 
Although judicial practices may ameliorate perceptions of 
unfairness, there are at least three reasons to doubt that they fully 
address the problem. First, in many cases, the rituals surrounding 
plea acceptance and sentencing lack real significance as 
decisionmaking processes. Guilty pleas only very rarely are 
rejected,211 while sentences often are effectively dictated by the 
terms of the plea agreement.212 Procedural justice in these contexts 
may thus appear an empty formality and serve only to highlight the 
absence of procedural justice in reaching the plea deal. 213 Second, 
while many judges display a strong commitment to procedural 
justice, others treat the formalities surrounding plea acceptance and 
206 See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. ll(b)(1) (requiring in-person guilty plea acceptance); Green 
v. United States, 365 U.S. 301, 304 (1961) (allowing defendant right to speak before 
sentencing). 
207 See, e.g., 18 U.S. C. § 3553(a)(4) (2000) (requiring court's consideration of sentencing 
guidelines in determining sentence); FED. R. CRIM. P. ll(b) (setting forth standards for guilty 
plea acceptance). 
208 See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(i)(3)(B) (requiring sentencing court to address matters 
that are controverted). 
209 See FED. R. CRIM. P. ll(b)(1) (requiring court to inform defendant of rights waived by 
guilty plea). 
210 See, e.g., United States v. Kraus, 137 F.3d 447, 454-55 (1998) (holding that district 
court judge's answer outside courtroom to prosecutor's hypothetical question regarding 
sentence violated Fed. R. Crim. P. ll(c)(1)). 
211 See, e.g., BOGIRA, supra note 25, at 335 ("[l]n their haste to bag a plea, judges at 26th 
Street sometimes accept a factual basis that's devoid offacts."); Turner, supra note 5, at 208 
n.28 (noting 1985 study finding that judges reject two percent of guilty pleas). 
212 See, e.g., King, supra note 5, at 295 (discussing how application offederal sentencing 
guidelines can be manipulated through plea agreements). 
213 See Dubber, supra note 5, at 552 (criticizing "hypocrisy that reduces the public plea 
colloquy before the judge to a carefully rehearsed charade during which the participants 
merely enact a script that was carefully crafted in the backroom of the prosecutor's office"). 
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sentencing with obvious disdain.214 It is hard to imagine that such 
judges are doing anything to inculcate positive perceptions of the 
criminal litigation process. 
Finally, to the extent that the procedural justice effect arises 
from the development of a fairness heuristic, as Tyler and others 
have argued, 215 procedural justice at the end of the process may be 
too late. Heuristic theory predicts that earlier received information 
should have a greater impact than later received information.216 As 
to fairness judgments specifically, laboratory research supports the 
hypothesis that such judgments are indeed most influenced by what 
happens earliest in the cognitive process.217 Defendants are thus 
apt to form their views about the fairness of the criminal justice 
system based on their interactions with police and prosecutors, and 
to assimilate their perceptions of judicial conduct to the earlier 
formed heuristic. 218 
2. Criminal Defendants Are Different. The social psychology 
model is derived from a host of empirical studies testing the 
attitudes and conduct of a great many people in a wide variety of 
settings,219 but perhaps the model cannot be generalized to criminal 
defendants. Mter all, defendants, as a class, have many 
distinguishing demographic characteristics.220 In contrast to 
214 See, e.g., BOGIRA, supra note 25, at 39 (describing judge's habit of "rac[ing] through" 
standard admonishments to ensure voluntariness of plea and describing one case in which 
total of fifteen minutes was spent on accepting plea and determining sentence); Julian A. 
Cook, III, Crumbs From the Master's Table: The Supreme Court, Pro Se Defendants and the 
Federal Guilty Plea Process, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1895, 1900 (2006) (criticizing use of 
leading and compound questions by judges in assessment of validity of guilty pleas). 
215 See supra note 51 and accompanying text. 
216 Tyler & Lind, supra note 37, at 78. 
217 See id. ("[F]airness heuristic theory predicts that the first-received fairness 
information, whether it is procedural fairness information or distributive fairness 
information, should have greater impact that [sic] later fairness information."). 
218 This concern might be addressed through greater judicial involvement in crafting the 
plea deal, as opposed to merely accepting an already negotiated resolution. Judicial 
participation in plea bargaining has been the subject of considerable academic debate, Herzog, 
supra note 146, at 593, and is prohibited or discouraged in most jurisdictions, Turner, supra 
note 5, at 202. To the extent that judicial involvement has increased,judges should be careful 
to attend to the procedural norms proposed in this Article. 
219 See generally Tyler & Lind, supra note 37 (noting expansive research among variety 
of groups). 
220 See U.S. Dep't of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics Criminal Offenders Statistics, 
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/crimoff.htm#inmates (last visited Jan. 17, 2008) (reporting 
demographic statistics of inmates). 
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members of the general population, defendants are considerably 
more likely to be young and male, to belong to a racial minority 
group, to suffer from addiction, to have low levels of educational 
achievement, and so forth. 221 Do general principles of social 
psychology apply to such a distinct social group? In particular, to 
the extent that Tyler's model is premised on desires to maintain 
social standing,222 we may justifiably question whether the model 
functions in the context of those who are already socially 
marginalized. 223 
The empirical research, however, indicates otherwise. Studies 
have found evidence of consistent procedural justice effects across 
categories of race, ethnicity, gender, income, and educational 
attainment.224 Moreover, procedural justice effects have been found 
in numerous studies specifically involving criminal defendants, 
arrestees, andprisoninmates.225 Additional, albeit indirect, support 
for these conclusions comes from the abundant empirical literature 
on victim-offender mediation and other forms of"restorativejustice" 
(R.J.). R.J., which contemplates responding to crime through 
processes that offer voice and respectful treatment,226 has been 
221 See Casper et al., supra note 12, at 488 (noting young age, racial minority status, low 
education levels, and high unemployment levels of felony defendants). 
222 See supra note 50 and accompanying text. 
223 In a similar vein, one might speculate that the fairness heuristic strand of Tyler's 
model, see supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text, might not work with defendants who, 
because of their marginalization, are strongly predisposed to view the legal system as unfair 
or who, because of mental illness, have unconventional patterns of cognitive functioning. 
224 See Tyler & Lind, supra note 37, at 73 (discussing research); MacCoun, supra note 34, 
at 187 ("[M]ost studies have found striking similarities across demographic groups in the 
antecedents and consequences of procedural fairness .... "). 
225 See, e.g., TYLER & Huo, supra note 35, at 33 (noting that within sample studied, thirty-
two percent reported that their most recent contact with legal authorities was through being 
stopped by police); Anne M. Heinz, Procedure Versus Consequences: Experimental Evidence 
of Preferences for Procedural and Distributive Justice, in COURTS AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE: 
EMERGING ISSUES 13, 16 (Susette M. Talarico ed., 1985) (describing study of felony 
defendants); Bottoms, supra note 100, at 254-56 (discussing studies of prison inmates); 
Casper et al., supra note 12, at 487-88 (discussing study of felony defendants); Pauline 
Houlden, Impact of Procedural Modifications on Evaluations of Plea Bargaining, 15 LAW & 
Soc'yREV. 267,290 (1980) (discussing study of inmates); Jean M. Landis & Lynne Goodstein, 
When Is Justice Fair? An Integrated Approach to the Outcome Versus Procedure Debate, 1986 
AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 675, 675 (1987) (discussing study of inmates); Paternoster et al., supra 
note 13, at 175-76 (discussing study of domestic violence arrestees); Tom R. Tyler, The Role 
of Perceived Injustice in Defendants' Evaluations of Their Courtroom Experience, 18 LAW & 
Soc'y REV. 51, 59 (1984) (discussing study of defendants in traffic and misdemeanor court). 
226 See MacCoun, supra note 34, at 177 ("[P]rocedural justice theory has played an 
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found in numerous studies to produce higher levels of satisfaction 
and lower levels of recidivism among offender-participants than 
does the conventional criminal justice system. 227 
Recent empirical research by social psychologist Larry Heuer 
suggests why procedural justice might matter as much to members 
of socially marginalized groups as to others. 228 Heuer's work 
indicates that the relationship between respectful treatment and 
perceived fairness is just as strong in transactions between 
members of different social groups as it is in transactions between 
members of the same social group.229 Based on this research, Heuer 
contends that: 
[]]n encounters with out-group members, respect 
continues to matter because people are also motivated to 
believe that members of other groups value their groups. 
For example, in an encounter between two strangers-a 
young black male civilian and a middle-aged white police 
officer in New York City-it is likely that neither 
individual thinks of the other as a member of the same 
highly-valued social group. Regardless, the civilian may 
still be highly sensitive to whether the officer treats him 
with respect because respect communicates an 
important role in the restorative justice movement. Restorative justice draws on the notion 
ofvoice and respect from procedural justice .... " (citations omitted)). 
227 See Barton Poulson, A Third Voice: A Review of Empirical Research on the 
Psychological Outcomes of Restorative Justice, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 167, 201 ("The data in this 
review were consistently favorable to restorative justice when compared to adjudication. If 
outcomes such as fairness, accountability, satisfaction, contrition and forgiveness, emotional 
well-being, and feelings of safety are important, then restorative justice is the clear choice."); 
see also Umbreit et al., supra note 111, at 284-89 (summarizing studies of recidivism rates 
among restorative justice participants). Although the results of some of the R.J. studies may 
be criticized because offenders self-selected themselves for participation, other studies have 
employed random assignment procedures and still reported favorable results. See Poulson, 
supra, at 169-70 (analyzing studies). It is notable, moreover, that R.J. participants, despite 
their enhanced perceptions of fairness, do not necessarily report greater satisfaction with 
outcomes, id. at 198, which lends support to the view they are responding to procedural 
justice effects. 
228 See Heuer, supra note 11, at 221-25 (discussing how group standing affects belief of 
fairness). 
229 /d. Some studies do, however, suggest that procedural justice effects are diminished 
among so-called "separatists"-that is, those "relatively rare" people "with a strong minority 
identification and a weak identification with American society .... " MacCoun, supra note 34, 
at 188. 
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important message about what the police officer thinks 
of the standing of the civilian's social group.230 
In short, Heuer's analysis helps us to see that many of those who 
are marginalized by what we might view as "mainstream" society 
possess social identities that are important to them within other 
groups; the perceived status of these other groups may be implicated 
in their interactions with legal authorities. 
3. Bargaining Is Just a Blip on the Radar Screen. For many 
defendants, plea negotiations represent but a brief moment in a 
lengthy involvement with the criminal justice system. Interactions 
with the prosecutor are followed not only by interactions with the 
judge, but also months, years, or even decades of incarceration, 
supervised release, or both. During this time, defendants may feel 
themselves in the power of corrections officers, probation officers, 
pardon and parole boards, appellate tribunals, and so forth. 
Treatment by such authorities over an extended period of time will 
be perceived as fair or unfair and may ultimately overcome any 
contrary impressions of the criminal justice system at the start of 
the process. Perhaps, in short, we would do better to focus our 
procedural justice efforts on prison officials and probation officers 
rather than on prosecutors.231 
Although some defendants face a lengthy period of intensive 
involvement with the criminal justice system, many others do not. 
In misdemeanor and other low-level cases, the defendant is apt to 
receive a sentence of straight probation or a relatively brief period 
of closer supervision. In such cases, interactions with the prosecutor 
will loom particularly large as a source of information for the 
defendant about the fairness of the system as a whole. This 
suggests that plea bargaining reforms might do well to focus on low-
stakes cases; in more serious cases, procedural justice benefits may 
230 Heuer, supra note 11, at 223. 
231 Sumner Sydeman and his colleagues have offered a similar critique of Tyler's claim 
that procedural justice in civil commitment hearings will enhance therapeutic outcomes. See 
Sumner J. Sydeman et al., Procedural Justice in the Context of Civil Commitment: A Critique 
of Tyler's Analysis, 3 PSCYHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 207, 215 (1997) ("The encounter of the 
respondent with legal authorities is quite limited in commitment hearings ... , and as such 
constitutes only a brief'blip' in the overall treatment experience."). 
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be overcome or rendered superfluous by good or bad treatment in 
pnson. 
On the other hand, there may also be real significance to 
procedural justice, even in serious cases. While acceptance of a 
conviction and sentence may enhance compliance with prison rules 
and the directives of corrections officers, 232 contrary attitudes at the 
start of a prison term may lead to early disciplinary problems that 
establish a pattern of harshly adversarial interactions with 
corrections officers. Moreover, as noted in the previous section, 
heuristic theory predicts that earlier received information 
(procedural justice in plea bargaining) will have greater influence 
than later received information (procedural justice in prison). Once 
reached, fairness judgments, either positive or negative, may be 
difficult to reverse. 233 
4. The Empirical Studies Themselves Indicate a Surprising 
Degree of Satisfaction with Plea Bargaining. Much empirical 
research supports both the general hypothesis that procedural 
justice influences perceived legitimacy and the acceptance of legal 
rules and decisions, and the more specific hypothesis that 
procedural justice effects carry over into the criminal litigation 
context.234 Unfortunately, there is much less empirical research 
available on plea bargaining in particular. There is no obvious 
reason, however, why the procedural justice dynamics would differ 
fundamentally in this context in comparison with, for example, a 
police officer's conduct during an arrest.235 Thus, one might be 
surprised to learn of one of the chief findings of some of the studies 
that have been conducted on plea bargaining: pleading guilty is 
associated with higher levels of perceived fairness among 
defendants than is going to trial. 236 This finding poses a problem for 
the thesis that legitimacy and acceptance may be enhanced by 
232 See supra notes 91-115 and accompanying text. 
233 These timing considerations also underscore the need for police to attend to procedural 
justice, since an arrest by police officers is typically the very first step in the criminal process. 
234 See supra notes 35-39 and accompanying text. 
235 See supra note 54 and accompanying text. 
236 See Casper et al., supra note 12, at 499 ("[A] higher level of perceived procedural 
fairness is not associated with the trial setting .... "); Landis & Goodstein, supra note 225, 
at 702 (noting results "in line with Casper's finding that defendants who plea bargain are 
more likely than those who go to trial to perceive their 'treatment' as fair"). But see Heinz, 
supra note 225, at 26 (finding that felony defendants preferred trials). 
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aligning plea bargaining practices with the procedural justice model. 
After all, criminal trials are commonly viewed as the ne plus ultra 
of due process. If plea bargaining is perceived as no less 
procedurally fair than a trial, it might seem that either (a) plea 
bargaining practices already provide ample proceduraljustice, or (b) 
perceived fairness, at least in this context, is not significantly 
influenced all that much by procedural justice. 
This reasoning, however, is based on a faulty premise. A 
criminal trial may be the ultimate of due process in the cramped 
way that the term is understood in legal doctrine, but that does not 
necessarily mean that a criminal trial actually embodies procedural 
justice in a meaningful way. Consider voice, often viewed as the 
core attribute of procedural justice. Alexandra N atapoff recently 
has catalogued the ways that criminal procedure "silences" 
defendants.237 In cases that go to trial, nearly half of defendants are 
dissuaded from testifying, largely because of the danger of pe:rjury 
charges and sentence enhancements, and the possibility that 
evidence of criminal history will be introduced for impeachment 
purposes.238 Moreover, given the general structure of criminal 
liability, the testimony that is relevant and helpful to a defendant 
will be quite narrowly circumscribed in many cases, often excluding 
motive and mitigating circumstances that do not satisfy the 
technical requirements for an affirmative defense.239 Although 
defendants may place a high value on being able to express their 
views on such matters, they may be prevented from doing so on 
relevance grounds or discouraged from doing so by defense counsel's 
intent to develop a more legally advantageous, but less authentic, 
"story."240 Lurking in the background of all this is the troubling 
reality of indigent criminal defense. Overburdened defense counsel 
simply may be incapable of ensuring that the defendant's 
perspective is adequately conveyed at trial. Of course, poor legal 
representation is a structural problem that infects not only trials, 
but also guilty pleas. At the same time, given the idealized role of 
237 Alexandra Natapoff, Speechless: The Silencing of Criminal Defendants, 80 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 1449 (2005). 
238 /d. at 1459-60. 
239 See id. at 1469-70 ("[D]efendant motive, jury sympathy, and mitigating circumstances 
that do not rise to the level of technical defenses are irrelevant."). 
240 !d. at 14 70. 
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trials in the popular imagination, it would not be surprising if there 
were heightened expectations for meaningful voice at trial and if 
counsel's failure to provide voice rankled more in the trial setting 
than elsewhere. 241 In short, we ought not take much comfort in 
findings that plea bargaining is perceived to be more procedurally 
fair than going to trial; there are good reasons to suspect that trials 
systematically fall far short of defendant expectations from a 
procedural justice standpoint. 242 
Additionally, we should note that the case disposition findings 
emerge from studies conducted in particular times and places. Tlul 
data was drawn from the 1970s and early 1980s, 243 before tho 
explosion of get-tough sentencing laws that greatly enhanced 
prosecutorial plea-bargainingleverage.244 As the prosecutor's ability 
to effectively dictate the terms of the plea deal has increased. it 
would not be surprising to learn that defendant perception~"! of 
procedural fairness have diminished. Moreover, the studies Uutf. 
covered particular jurisdictions, 245 did not detail the plea bargu i 11 in l( 
practices in those jurisdictions.246 It may be that the prcvni.lllltJ 
practices in those jurisdictions were relatively strong fmnt tl 
procedural justice standpoint. If so, satisfaction with procedurn!il in 
those jurisdictions would not necessarily indicate satiHlfl(~thHl 
elsewhere. 
241 See Tom R. Tyler et al., Influence ofVoice on Satisfaction with Leaderu: lC:Vpb#'ii!J( t/iM 
Meaning of Process Control, 48 J. PERS. & Soc. PSYCHOL. 72 (1985) ("[WIIHlll fii?(JJ)i{r (~~ijlt/Hil: 
their opportunity to speak is a 'sham,' rather than an honest opport\wit:y W 1;\tltWlliW ilw 
decision, they may react ... with anger."). . .. · 
242 Landis and Goodstein relate their case disposition findings to delbntltltik f)i'~Jt4'i!!iJ!{;iJ 
for resolving uncertainties as quickly as possible in the process; be(!nlllil(1tli!!H l.l!tf~!lilihtlf 
resolves uncertainties more quickly than trial, defendants percoiv(• UH• miJ•.Ju\(ti'l~ · t;f 
bargaining to be more fair. Landis & Goodstein, supra note 225, at 70:t 'l.'l!i• l!ftilt~J~(i!hi\}i 
hypothesis, if correct, would lend greater support to the proposal lH'i'H f.IHll J}J'iltihi'l~hini 
employ objective criteria in plea bargaining; such criteria would permit (l(ll\'il!l\flllli!lll!!!Hhof• 
lawyers to develop a reliable sense of likely outcomes in many cast~s •M* li!)fn.n~ \J!H'j.(!f{lilfltl 
begins. ·. · . · 
243 See Casper et al., supra note 12, at 487-88 (drawing datu f'l·nnl .W'Hl<•l, Ltffl'HF<i tli 
Goodstein, supra note 225, at 685 (drawing data from early 1980H). 
244 O'Hear, supra note 5, at 888. . . . 
245 See Casper et al., supra note 12, at 487 (covering Baltimlll't•, [J!)ft,.•lt,. iFifl \'hu•,rrlKi• 
Landis & Goodstein, supra note 225, at 685 (covering Illinois nnd l'vlh'!U'i!~JJlnL · .~ · . · .. 
246 Casper et al., supra note 12, at 487, Landis & Goodstein. ,Qu{lr'l! !lilf(i: '.tM. ;~J II~ I\ 
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V. CONCLUSION 
In a system dominated by plea bargaining, criminal justice has 
become more a matter of administrative than of judicial 
adjudication. AE, Gerard Lynch has argued, this transformation is 
neither intrinsically good nor bad.247 Rather, the question is 
whether, given a range of different ways of structuring 
administrative adjudication, decisions are being made in a manner 
that effectively advances the underlying goals of the criminal justice 
system. Doing so undoubtedly requires accuracy in separating the 
guilty from the innocent and in separating those deserving of heavy 
punishment from those deserving of light punishment. Yet an 
exclusive focus on the outcomes of plea bargaining misses the 
important contributions that process potentially makes to the 
acceptance of outcomes and ultimately makes to attitudes about the 
legitimacy of the criminal justice system. Procedural justice in plea 
bargaining thus warrants considerably more attention than it has 
received from scholars and practitioners. 
Drawing on a large body of procedural justice research, I have 
proposed five process norms for plea bargaining: (1) defendant 
voice, (2) use of objective criteria in making and responding to plea 
offers, (3) explanation of plea bargaining positions, (4) consideration 
of defendant arguments, and (5) avoidance of high-pressure tactics 
that show disrespect for defendants' legal rights. The specifics of 
how these norms are best implemented will vary by jurisdiction, 
depending on such factors as case volume, resources available to law 
enforcement and court personnel, offender demographics, and local 
rules and customs of criminal procedure. In some jurisdictions, 
robust procedural justice norms can be implemented with little or 
no disruption of existing practices; in such locales, there seems no 
good reason for prosecutors not to incorporate the norms into office 
policies and practices. In other jurisdictions, particularly those 
where the total amount of time that judges and lawyers spend on 
most cases is better measured in minutes than hours, implementing 
247 See Lynch, supra note 4, at 2145 ("An understanding of the different functions ofthe 
administrative andjudicial aspects of our current system, moreover, should help us to identify 
areas in need of change-and areas where change is not needed."). This position also seems 
consistent with emerging scholarly consensus. See supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text. 
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procedural justice may be considerably more challenging. It is in 
such settings that we are most likely to see real trade-offs between 
procedural and distributive justice. 
The prospect of such trade-offs doubtlessly explains much of the 
traditional disregard for procedural justice in plea bargaining. I 
have attempted to show, however, that the significance of these 
trade-offs may be less than is commonly assumed. Procedural 
justice can be meaningfully delivered through processes that are 
well short of trial-type adjudication. Moreover, procedural justice 
need not necessarily undercut, but may actually make important 
contributions to, distributive justice. Additionally, given what 
seems to be a substantial degree of indeterminacy in the content of 
distributive justice, any claims as to distributive justice costs must 
be advanced with some modesty. Finally, whatever the costs may 
be, they should be assessed relative to the expected benefits of 
increased acceptance and perceived legitimacy among 
defendants-including greater cooperativeness with legal 
authorities and reduced risks of recidivism-as well as the benefits 
of enhanced transparency to system outsiders. 
Certainly the assessment of many of the costs and benefits of 
procedural justice in plea bargaining remains largely at the level of 
hypothesis and requires considerably more real-world 
experimentation and empirical research. There are compelling 
reasons to believe, however, that thoughtful efforts to integrate 
procedural justice norms into plea bargaining will not only help the 
system do a better job of giving defendants the sort of fair treatment 
that they want and deserve, but also will advance important public 
interests in efficient and transparent crime control. 
